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PROGRESSIVE AND CONSERVATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISMt
Robin West*

American constitutional law in general, and fourteenth amendment jurisprudence in particular, is in a state of profound transformation. The "liberal-legalist" and purportedly politically neutral
understanding of constitutional guarantees that dominated constitutional law and theory during the fifties, sixties, and seventies, is waning, both in the courts and in the academy. 1 What is beginning to
replace liberal legalism in the academy, and what has clearly replaced
it on the Supreme Court, is a very different conception - a new paradigm - of the role of constitutionalism, constitutional adjudication,
and constitutional guarantees in a democratic state. Unlike the liberal-legal paradigm it is replacing, the new paradigm is overtly political - and overtly conservative - in its orientation and aspiration.
Over the last few years, a substantial and growing number of
Supreme Court Justices, federal judges, and some theorists, including
Raoul Berger, Robert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, Michael McConnell,
Sandra Day O'Connor, Richard Posner, and Antonin Scalia, have begun to articulate a profoundly conservative interpretation of the constitutional tradition. 2 There are obviously many differences between
t © 1990 by Robin West
• Professor, University of Maryland School of Law; Visiting Research Fellow, Institute for
Philosophy and Public Policy, College Park, Maryland. B.A. 1976, J.D. 1979, University of
Maryland; J.S.M. 1982, Stanford University. - Ed. I would like to thank the participants in the
Cleveland-Marshall Legal Series Seminar, the Chicago Law School Legal Theory Seminiar, the
University of Maryland Legal Theory Workshop, the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy
Political Theory Workshop, and the New York University Law School Jurisprudence Seminar
for helpful comments on early drafts of this essay. Cass Sunstein, David Luban, Michael Kelly,
Jana Singer, Robert Green, Richard Posner, and Lynne Henderson gave help, criticisms, and
encouragement at various stages along the way.
1. Among the classic articulations of the "liberal-legalist" regime, see, for example, Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLEs, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1961); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
2. See, e.g.• R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1989); R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF
JUSTICE (1981); Berger, Federalism: The Founders' Design -A Response to Michael McConnell,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (1988); Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation,
73 CORNELL L. REV. 350 (1988); Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation": The Activist Flight
from the Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1986); Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296 (1986); Berger, Some Reflections on lnterpretivism, 55
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1986); Berger, The Activist Legacy of the New Deal Court, 59 WASH. L.
REV. 751 (1984); Berger, G. Edward White's Apology for Judicial Activism, 63 TEXAS L. REV.
367 (1984); Berger, Against an Activist Court, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 173 (1982); Bork, Neutral
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the conservative views of each of these theorists. But there is also significant commonality: the conservatives share enough ground and sufficient themes that we can discern, without too much difficulty, an
emerging conservative paradigm of. constitutional interpretation what this article calls "conservative constitutionalism." Conservative
constitutionalism now dominates the Supreme Court, may soon dominate the federal judiciary, and has already profoundly shaped the constitutional law of the foreseeable future.
The modem transformation of constitutional law and theory, however, goes even deeper than the influence of conservative constitutionalism. For at the same time that conservative constitutionalism has
replaced liberal legalism on the Court, a new progressive conception of
constitutional interpretation has begun to replace the critical and
deconstructive scholarship that dominated the dissenting discourse of
the last two decades. 3 Over the last decade or so, a number of progressiv~ legal academicians, including Cass Sunstein, David Strauss,
Suzanna Sherry, Catharine MacKinnon, and Frank Michelman,
among others - and joined by some critical and liberal scholars, such
as Roberto Unger and Laurence Tribe - have begun to articulate yet
another alternative not only to the mid-century liberal legal understanding of constitutional interpretation, but also to the view of constitutionalism that emerged from the Critical Legal Studies movement's
powerful critique of liberal-legalism during those same years. 4 This
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. I (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles]; Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622
(1985) [hereinafter Easterbrook, A Reply]; Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 {1984); Easterbrook, Legal
Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J. L. & Pua. POLY. 87 (1984); Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SuP. Cr. REV. 85; Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 533 {1983); McConnell, The Role ofDemocratic Politics in Transforming Moral
Convictions into Law (Book Review), 98 YALE L. J. 1501 (1989); see also R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Wilson, Justice Diffused:
A Comparison of Edmund Burke's Conservatism With the Views of Five Conservative, Academic
Judges, 40 u. MIAMI L. REV. 913 (1986).
3. Mark Tushnet has produced the most consistent and incisive critical constitutional scholarship. See M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988). For a general introduction to the thinking of the Critical Legal Studies
movement, see M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987).
4. See, e.g., c. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989): c.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2d ed. 1988); L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985); Michelman, Law's Republic, 97
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces of Self-Government]; Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 659, 677
[hereinafter Michelman, Welfare Rights]; Sherry, Outlaw Blues (Book Review), 87 MICH. L.
1418 (1989); Sherry, Republican Citizenship in a Democratic Society (Book Review), 66
TEXAS L. REV. 1229 (1988); Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 1001 (1988) [hereinafter Sherry, The Ninth Amendment]; Strauss,
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989) [hereinafter
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alternative constitutional paradigm, developed not in the courts, but in
th.e academy, is also overtly political: all of these theorists are progres- ·
sive, explicitly liberatory or even liberationist in their political tilt.
These theorists as well are divided by significant internal differences,
but, as with the leaders of conservative constitutionalism, there is
enough shared ground that we can meaningfully speak of a second
new jurisprudential understanding of constitutional interpretation
coming on the heels of the demise of the liberal legal paradigm. We
might call this second post-liberal alternative "progressive
constitutionalism."
The paradigm shift, then, in its totality, is this: the liberal and
critical legal discourses that dominated constitutional law in the sixties
and seventies have been replaced by conservative and progressive discourses, respectively. Not only the answers, but more importantly, the
questions posed by our leading constitutional jurists and theorists have
been radically transformed.
The first and major purpose of this article is to describe these two
new constitutional paradigms. The article's central thesis is that the
understandings of the constitutional tradition most central to both
paradigms are determined by sometimes implicit, but more often explicit, political dispositions toward various forms of social and private
power, and the normative authority to which social and private power
gives rise. Very broadly, conservative constitutionalists view private
or social normative authority as the legitimate and best source of guidance for state action; accordingly, they view both the Constitution and
constitutional adjudication as means of preserving and protecting that
authority and the power that unciergirds it against either legislative or
judicial encroachment. Progressive constitutionalists, in sharp contrast, view the power and normative authority of some social groups
over others as the fruits of illegitimate private hierarchy, and regard
the Constitution as one important mechanism fo~ challenging those
entrenched private orders. Where the conservative is likely to see in a
particular social or private institution a source of communitarian wisdom and legitimate normative authority, the progressive is likely to
see the product of social or private hierarchy, and the patterns of domination, subordination, and oppression that inevitably attend, such inequalities of power. The profound substantive differences between the
conservative and progressive understandings of what the fourteenth
Strauss, The Taming of Brown]; Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. Cr. REV. 99;
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987); Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
HARV. L. REV. 563 (1983).
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amendment requires, and of the meaning of constitutionalism more
generally, are rooted in these contrasting political attitudes toward social power. Correlatively, the debate presently ongoing between
progressives and conservatives is only superficially over interpretive
issues; on a more substantive level it is over the value of the visions of
the good defined by the various hierarchies that make up our private
and social life.
Thus, while the constitutional debate of the last two decades or so
focused on the purported neutrality and the permissible scope of judicial decisionmaking in democratic society, constitutional debate of the
next decade, and into the next century, will focus instead on the merits
and vices of various forms of social and private power and authority,
and hence the wisdom of using state power - through either the legislative, executive, or judicial branch - to upset them. This is the sense
in which the questions - and not just the answers - of constitutional
discourse have been altered. Neither the modern conservatives nor the
modern progressives seem overly concerned with the issues that
consumed constitutionalists of the last twenty or thirty years: the
antimajoritarian difficulty posed by judicial review and even constitutionalism itself; the propriety of and justifications for judicial review;
the liberal requirement of judicial neutrality; the derivation of particular outcomes from neutral principles; or, on the other side, critical
demonstrations that the antimajoritarian difficulty is both insoluble
and necessary within the contradictory assumptions of liberal theory;
that judicial review can be neither justified nor abandoned; that derivations of favored outcomes from neutral principles are not possible. 5
These are simply not the issues that stir our most contemporary progressive and conservative constitutional scholars. Rather, both the
progressives and conservatives seem increasingly willing to grant to
the critics of liberal theory their main point - that liberal neutrality
in judging is illusory, and that constitutional adjudication is consequently necessarily political. Modern constitutional scholarship is
generally characterized by a desire to take up the question that such a
premise quite clearly implies: If the decisions of judges, no less than of
legislators, are necessarily political - and hence necessarily grounded
in some normative conception of the good - what politics should
judges pursue, and on the basis of what conception of the good should
they act?
Conservative and progressive answers to that question are
grounded in contrasting attitudes toward majoritarianism, which in
5. See generally M. TusHNET, supra note 3.
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tum directly stem from the contrasting attitudes toward social power
that divide progressive and conservative political thought. Significantly, conservatives and progressives agree that untrammeled majoritarianism poses dangers, and that there is, consequently, a justification
for constitutional restraints and an independent judiciary to enforce
them. However, conservatives and progressives have sharply conflicting assessments of the type of danger posed by majoritarianism, and
hence of the content and meaning of our constitutional guarantees. To
the conservative, a governing popular "majority" carries the danger of
being or becoming an irresponsible and excessively egalitarian, or "leveling," mechanism bent on the redistribution of social wealth, power,
and prestige. 6 Against such democratic excess, the Constitution offers
the conservative some hope of protecting, and conserving, the existing
social order. To the progressive, a governing popular "majority" is
dangerous for a different reason: it is always in danger of becoming
excessively beholden to a staid, tradition-laden, backward, regressive
political vision. 7 "Majorities" tend to guard their majority status with
almost paranoid fervor, and hence over-identify with existing social
orders. Against this regressive tendency the Constitution offers some
disruptive inspiration.
These differing attitudes toward the danger posed by majoritarianism are, in turn, grounded in fundamentally contrasting attitudes toward the social order that the "majority" is perceived as either
threatening or unduly conserving. For the conservative, social institutions depend on distributions of wealth, power, and normative authority that are worthy of respect and preservation, while for the
progressive those institutions are as often as not the illegitimate fruit
of damaging and hurtful patterns of oppression, domination, and
subordination.
In brief, then, modem constitutional law and theory can be understood as focused on this question: Should the Constitution be read,
and the courts used, as a vehicle to preserve existing social and private
orderings against majoritarian political change - making it an essentially conservative document, protecting the status quo against democratic excess - or should it be read and implemented in such a way as
to facilitate continuous, inventive challenges to the dominant private
and social order, making it a guarantor of at least progressive inspiration, if not progressive change? This is not, in a sense, a novel claim;
6. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 4. This basis for distrust of majority
power is a central theme in liberal as well as progressive thought. See J. MILL, ON LIBERTY
(1859).
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in fact, it is a frequently heard complaint that what constitutional theory is really - and covertly - about is the merits and demerits of
private and social hierarchy. What I want to do is give content to this
description of constitutional commitments and debates, enrich it, and
thereby, perhaps, iegitimate it.
A complete restatement, analysis, and point-by-point contrast of
the conservative and progressive constitutional paradigms is obviously
beyond the scope of this article. The article focuses instead on three
particular and topical issues of constitutional law on which conservatives and progressives have sharply divergent views, and attempts to
show that at least those differences can best be understood as stemming from the divergent attitudes toward social power described
above. Two of these issues are substantive and one is theoretical.
First, most conservative constitutional theorists and judges vehemently reject the "privacy jurisprudence" developed by the Warren
and Burger Courts during the sixties and early seventies, and particularly disagree with both the conclusion and reasoning of the Burger
Court's most controversial decision, Roe v. Wade. 8 Correlatively, conservatives tend to support both the outcome reached by the Rehnquist
Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 9 in which the Court signaled a clear
retreat from both the reasoning and outcome of the privacy cases, and
the more recent Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 10 in which
the Court severely restricted the scope of reproductive rights by expanding the range of permissible state regulations over abortions.
Progressives, in contrast both to most conservatives and to some liberal legalists11 as well, tend to support the outcome in Roe and dissent
from the result reached in Bowers. 12 In theoretical or jurisprudential
terms, the difference might be cast this way: progressives tend to support an "affirmative" understanding of the liberty protected by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment - in which case, reproductive and sexual freedom is at least arguably included within the
sphere of due process protection - while conservatives read the clause
as protecting "negative liberty" only, i.e., the right to be free from
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
10. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
11. For liberal arguments against Roe, see J. ELY, supra note 1, at 11-41, and M. PERRY,
MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW 572-78 (1988).
12. For progressive arguments in support of Roe, see Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3067 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Brief for the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellees, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); Olsen,
Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REv. 105 (1989); Sherry, Women's Virtue, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 159J (1989).
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certain defined interferences. This article ultimately argues that the
difference is best explained by reference to the theorists' and Justices'
sharply conflicting assessments of the legitimacy and value of one important source of social authority and power: the normative authority
of a community's positive morality, and the social power on which
that authority is based.
Second, progressive and conservative constitutional theorists
sharply divide over the constitutionality and social value of voluntarily
adopted affirmative action plans which are meant to remedy the effects
of past, unconscious, or institutional racism on the performance of minorities in various economic, professional, and cultural markets. Conservatives generally dispute the constitutionality of such plans, and
accordingly support the Rehnquist Court's decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 13 which held that, except for in very narrowly drawn circumstances, affirmative action plans voluntarily
adopted by state or local governmental entities for the purpose of rectifying the effects of past societal discrimination in economic markets
are unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Progressives, by contrast, generally support the
constitutionality as well as the wisdom of affirmative action plans and
tend to read the equal protection clause either as neutral toward such
plans or as in fact requiring them; they are accordingly critical of the
present Court's hostility toward such plans and disagree particularly
with the result in Croson. 14
This disagreement quite obviously rests on drastically divergent
understandings of the meaning, requirements, and perhaps the history
of the equal protection clause. It also rests, however, on different philosophical understandings of the meaning of the "equality" that the
clause is designed to promote, encourage, or ensure. Very roughly,
progressives tend to support a "substantive" understanding of the
equality guaranteed by the equal protection clause - which has the
effect of requiring or at least permitting affirmative action to rectify the
effects of past discrimination in the private sector - while conservatives support a "formal" or "legal" interpretation, which arguably has
the effect of invalidating such plans. 15 This article argues that the difference can best be understood as resting on contrasting assessments of
the value of a second source of private authority and power: the normative authority of private markets, and the social and economic
power on which that authority rests.
13. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
14. See, e.g., Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, supra note 4.
15. See infra notes 55-60 & 106-108 and accompanying text.
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Finally, conservative and progressive constitutionalists differ over
the nature of constitutional interpretation itself. Conservative constitutionalists tend to support two basic principles of constitutional interpretation: first, that interpreters should defer whenever possible to the
originally intended meaning of the Constitution's drafters, and second,
that judges should defer, whenever possible, to the will of legislators.
Conservatives tend to advocate originalism, judicial restraint, or both,
as guiding principles of constitutional adjudication. 16 Progressives, by
contrast, argue that constitutional interpretation should be in some
sense "open,'' or what I call "possibilistic": that the Constitution is
always open to multiple interpretations, which at least include interpretations capable of facilitating progressive causes and policies.17
This difference, I argue, is grounded in the contrasting attitudes toward yet a third type of social authority and power: the legitimacy,
wisdom, and morality of legal authority and power.
Political attitudes toward private and social power do not, however, in any simple way, directly imply either these or any other set of
particular constitutional commitments. The implication of a constitutional commitment arising from a political vision is complicated and often masked - by two factors. First, "constitutional law" is undeniably a field of law as well as politics, and constitutional theorists
and jurists are therefore legal theorists and legal actors, as well as adherents to political points of view. Constitutional theorists accordingly combine their political outlook toward social power with some
allegiance to a jurisprudential view of the nature of law, and particularly of the relation of law to social policy, to morality, and to politics
itself. As a result, differences in constitutional interpretation are often
believed to be and often appear to be rooted in jurisprudential differences and debates that divide conservatives and progressives along apparently apolitical lines: progressive natural lawyers debate
conservative instrumentalists as though the jurisprudential difference
between natural law and instrumentalism accounts for their disagreements in constitutional outlook; progressive positivists debate conservative natural lawyers on the same assumption, and so on. As I try
to show, however, the deepest divisions in modem constitutional
thought are a function not of jurisprudential differences, but of political orientation. Despite their casting, modem constitutional disagreements do not reflect or stem from the jurisprudential differences
between natural law, legal positivism, and legal pragmatism (although
16. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
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they are complicated by them), but rather from the vastly divergent
political assessments of the value or danger of private and social power
held by conservative and progressive constitutional scholars.
The second factor complicating and sometimes masking the dependence of the conservative and progressive constitutional paradigms on
their political underpinnings is that the respective political underpinnings are themselves not uniform. While there are substantial commonalities, there are also significant differences within as well as
between major conservative and progressive political theories. Briefly,
conservatives differ among themselves over the type of private or social
authority to which the state should tum when specifying a conception
of the good. 18 Progressives differ fundamentally over what types of
experiences of the disempowered should be at the heart of a socially
sensitive vision of the good. 19 As a result of these internal political
differences, conservative and progressive constitutional commitments
often - perhaps typically - command less than universal support
from conservative or progressive scholars: not all conservatives support every aspect of the conservative constitutional paradigm, nor do
all progressives support every aspect of the progressive paradigm.
What this article calls the "progressive constitutional paradigm" and
the "conservative constitutional paradigm," then, are simply those
core constitutional interpretations or commitments that are supported
by a critical mass of progressive or conservative constitutional scholars. It is worth stressing, however, that even the theorists who agree
on a particular constitutional commitment often do so for widely divergent political reasons.
.
The first two Parts of this article describe in some detail these two
constitutional paradigms, and their component parts: political theory,
jurisprudence, and constitutional commitments. The first Part describes the conservative constitutional paradigm and its three constituent components. It begins with a discussion of conservative political
thought; then turns to conservative jurisprudence; and finally, shows
how the three major conservative constitutional commitments summarized above can be derived from conservative political and jurisprudential theory. The second Part describes in a parallel fashion the
progressive constitutional paradigm.
The second purpose of this article is partisan rather than descriptive, and is addressed to progressives. It is not at all clear, from a
progressive political point of view, that the development of a progres18. See infra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
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sive constitutional paradigm - to which a conservative Court will be
openly hostile - is a worthwhile project. What would be gained? It is
at least arguable that progressives over the next few years should
devote themselves to the development of strategies that will minimize
the impact of constitutional adjudication on progressive politics,
rather than to the perfection of an alternative progressive model of
what the Constitution and the fourteenth amendment require, for
adoption by a counterfactual, nonexistent, and unforeseeable progressive Court.
The concluding Part of this article argues that even in the short
term, and certainly in the long term, there are good reasons for developing an alternative, non- or post-liberal, and explicitly progressive
paradigm of constitutional interpretation, even if it is clear, as it seems
to be, that the present conservative Supreme Court will not embrace it.
It also argues, however, that for both strategic and theoretical reasons,
the proper audience for the development of a progressive interpretation of the Constitution is Congress rather than the courts. The progressive Constitution should be meant for, and therefore must be
aimed toward, legislative rather than adjudicative change.
The strategic reasons for this proposed reorientation of progressive
constitutional discourse should be self-evident. Although the progressive Constitution is arguably consistent with some aspects of the liberal-legalist paradigm of the middle of this century, it is utterly
incompatible with the conservative paradigm now dominating constitutional adjudication. It does not follow, however, that the progressive Constitution is incompatible with all constitutional
decisionmaking: both legislatures and citizens have constitutional obligations, engage in constitutional discourse, and can be moved, presumably, to bring electoral politics in line with the progressive
mandates of the Constitution, as those mandates have been understood and interpreted by progressive constitutional lawyers and
theorists.
I also argue, however, that for theoretical as well as strategic reasons, the long-range success, the sense, and even more modestly the
relevance of the progressive interpretation of the Constitution, depend
not only on the merits of its interpretive claims, but also, and perhaps
more fundamentally, on a federal Congress re-enlivened to its constitutional obligations. First, of course, it is Congress, not the Court,
that is specifically mandated under the fourteenth amendment to take
positive action to ensure equal protection and due process rights the core constitutional tools for attacking illegitimate social and private power. If Congress is ever to fulfill this obligation, it will need the
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guidance of interpretive theories of the meaning of equal protection, _,
due process, equality, and liberty that are aimed explicitly toward the
context of legislative action and are not constrained by the possibilities
and limits of adjudicative law. But more fundamentally, the progressive Constitution, I argue, will never achieve· its full meaning - and
worse, will remain riddled with paradox· and contradiction - so long
as it remains in an adjudicative forum. This is not only because of the
probable political composition of the Court over the next few decades,
but also because of the philosophical and political meanings of adjudicative law itself: the possibilities of adjudicative law are constrained
by precisely the same profoundly conservative attitudes toward social
power that underlie conservative constitutionalism. By acquiescing in
a definition of the Constitution as a source of adjudicative law,
progressives seriously undermine its progressive potential. Only by
reconceptualizing the Constitution as a source of inspiration and guidance for legislation, rather than a superstructural constraint on adjudication, can we make good on its richly progressive promise.
Therefore, the concluding Part of this article argues that, for structural long-term as well as strategic short-term reasons, the progressive
Constitution - the cluster of meanings found or implanted in constitutional guarantees by modern progressive scholars - should be addressed to the Congress and to the citizenry, rather than to the courts.
The goal of progressive constitutionalists, both in the academy and at
the bar, over the coming decades should be to create what Bruce Ackerman has called in other contexts a "constitutional monient" 20 and
what Owen Fiss might call more dramatically an "interpretive crisis."21 Progressives need to create a world in which it is clear·that a
progressive Congress has embraced one set of constitutional meanings,
and the conservative Court a contrasting and incompatible set. The
Supreme Court does, and always has, as Fiss reminds us, read the
Constitution so as to avoid crisis. 22 The lesson to draw is surely that
only when faced with such a constitutional moment will this conservative Court change paths.
!.

THE CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM

A.

Conservative Politics

Modern political conservatism is grounded in and united by an
20. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022
(1984).
21. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 753-54 (1983).
22. Id. at 754.

652

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:641

aversion to the redistributive normative authority of the political state
and a commitment to the preservation, or conservation, of existing
social, economic, and legal entitlements and structures. Whatever else
they may hold or believe, conservatives distrust both the capacity of
state actors - whether judges or legislators - to generate, through
dialogue or any other means, desirable novel conceptions of social life
that would upset or redistribute extant entitlements; they also distrust
the willingness of state actors to legislate or adjudicate in a disinterested fashion in accordance with those conceptions. Accordingly, conservatives advocate minimizing the role of the normative authority
(although not the power) of the state: what the state should do is act
in such a way as to preserve, not question or alter, the constituent
structures of our social life. As this Part attempts to show, however,
even this minimal commitment is not as straightforward as it seems conservatives differ among themselves over the contours of "the state,"
over what forms of normative authority do or do not come within its
gambit, and over what sorts of preexisting social structures are most
worthy of protection. But conservatives are more or less united in
their antipathy for the specious forms of redistributive normative authority to which state power gives rise, and their commitment to the
preservation of extant social structures and entitlements.
In its distrust of the redistributive normative authority of the
political state, modern conservatism can claim a share in the mantle of
classical liberalism. Conservatives and classical liberals arrive at their
common distrust, however, by way of different routes. Classical liberals, far more than modern conservatives, constitutively distrust centralized power of any sort - and hence centralized state power as
well. Classical liberal distrust of a state's normative authority is derivative of this more fundamental distrust of power. Classical liberals
accordingly require the state, wherever possible, to defer to the normative authority of the smallest unit of power - individuals - and then
to promote that normative authority through noninterference. For
modern conservatives, by contrast, it is the distrust of the state's redistributive normative authority, rather than distrust of either state
power or power per se that is fundamental. What the state is peculiarly ill-suited to do, according to modern conservatives, is to formulate a respectable, defensible, or "legitimate" conception of the good or
of the good life that departs in any significant way from the conception
of the good reflected in and bolstered by extant social structures. Accordingly, what modern conservatives characteristically require of the
state is not inaction, passivity, or noninterference - modern conservatives often demand quite a bit of state action and quite a bit of state
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interference in private lives, and from all three branches. Rather,
what conservatives constitutively require of state actors is that they
refrain from imposing their own conception of the good on the community, and that they instead respect, preserve, conserve, and protect
the conception of the good promoted by preexisting social structures
and entitlements - what I will sometimes call the community's dominant normative authority. For the conservative, the political state
then has a duty to promote, protect, and encourage that form of life
reflected in the community's social structures and preexisting entitlements - a duty that can often be fulfilled simply through nollinterference with private lives, but that at least as often requires affirmative,
even aggressive, legislative, judicial, or executive intervention.
In its distrust of the redistributive normative authority of the political state, modem conservatism also claiins a share in the mantle of
modern liberalism, particularly modem legalistic liberalism. Many
(although not all) modem legal liberals also distrust the normative- authority of the state, but their distrust again rests on a very different
basis from either the modem conservative's or the classical liberal's.
Modem liberal legal distrust of the state's normative authority is
rooted not in a particular distrust of the normative authority of the
"state," but rather, in a generally skeptical stance toward normative
authority of any sort. There is no way a state actor can specify the
content of the good or the good life - beyond simply recording his or
her own preferences - because there is no way that anyone can do so.
There is, consequently, no principled way for a legislature to secondguess the value judgments of an individual, or for a court to secondguess the value judgments of a legislature. Conservative distrust of a
state's normative authority, by contrast, is rooted not in a general or
philosophical value-skepticism, but in a decidedly nonskeptical preference for the value judgments enshrined in those institutions that embody social power, and in an antipathy toward the value judgments
embodied in state authority that seeks to challenge that power. While
the liberal legalist and conservative share an overriding distrust of
state normativity, that distrust derives from profoundly divergent
political and social visions.
, The difference, then, between modem conservatism and both
classical and modem legal liberalism is fairly stark: while classical
liberals typically urge the state simply to refrain from interfering in the
private lives of individuals, and modem legal liberals urge the state to
refrain from all normative judgments, conservatives, although sharing
the liberal distrust of state authority, are not so tied to either the
value-skepticism insisted upon by modem legal liberalism or the indi-
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vidualistic premises of the classical liberal. For the conservative, the
state will often have a duty to exercise its power to promote, through
legislation, the good life on behalf of its citizens. The conception of
the good life the state is empowered to promote, however, must be
derived from the normative teachings of some dominant communi~ar
ian authority, and not from the will, beliefs, preferences, or desires of
state actors.
Modem conservatives differ among themselves on the type of social structures or communal authority to which the political state must
defer, and those differences in tum define the major lines of distinction
between popular forms of modem conservative political thought.
Although the lines are fuzzy, and exceptions abound, we can nevertheless distinguish three strands of modem conservative politics, each of
which has had a discernible - and distinctive - impact on the conservative constitutional paradigm.
First, some conservatives - who might be called "moralistic conservatives" or "social conservatives" - argue that the state should
defer to the accumulated wisdom of a community's positive conventional morality when formulating a vision of the good as a basis for
state action. 23 For these conservatives, the political state should legislate on the basis of the vision of the good promulgated by the dominant moral voices in a community's shared life, whether those voices
emanate from religious or secular moral traditions.
The social conservative's deference to the vision of the good propounded by the community's conventional morality is typically motivated by an attitude of respect - sometimes justified, sometimes not
- for the presumed wisdom of the dominant normative moral traditions, customs, beliefs, and values of the past. The ethical idea here is
simple enough: we should decide how to live by relying heavily on the
rules that have emerged from the experiences of others who have wrestled with comparable dilemmas. There is no reason, they argue, to
reinvent the moral wheel. History has its lessons, normative as well as
otherwise, and the moralistic conservative's embrace of traditional
wisdom is simply a recognition of the proper role that humility should
play toward the wisdom of the past in our attempt to make collective
sense out of our lives. Michael McConnell defends the moralistic conservative's respect for communal authority in this way: .
[W]hy [do] thoughtful individuals often defer to tradition and historical
experience when making moral judgments, rather than attempt[ing] a
23. See, e.g., P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORAIS (1965); Dworkin, "Natural'~ Law
Revisited, 34 u. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982); cf H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY
(1963).
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more individualistic or utopian analysis[?] Such deference is natural and
inevitable, . . . but it is also sensible. An individual has only his own,
necessarily limited, intelligence and experience (personal and vicarious)
to draw upon. Tradition, by contrast, is composed of the cumulative
thoughts and experiences of thousands of individuals over an expanse of
time, each of them making incremental and experimental alterations
(often unconsciously), which are then adopted or rejected (again, often
unconsciously) on the basis of experience - the experience, that is, of
whether they advance the good life. Much as a market is superior to
central planning for efficient operation of an economy, a tradition is superior to seemingly more "rational" modes of decisionmaking for attainment of moral knowledge. 24

It is this sense of deference to collective wisdom that drives moralistic
conservatives' allegiance to communal morals.
A second group of conservatives - who might be called "legal
conservatives" - argue that "the state," in the form of both legislators and adjudicators, should defer to the mandates of the community's established legal system, and its entrenched body of law, when
deciding how to ~ct. For legal conservatives, the modern political
state, including the judicial as well as the legislative branch, should
defer to the vision of the good articulated in established, historically
enshrined legal traditions, including, most significantly, constitutional
history and common law precedents. For these conservatives, the
political "state," and its entirely specious claims to normative competence, is importantly different from the "law" and its quite legitimate
claims: indeed, that there is a difference between the law and the state,
such that the "law," and the rational, reasoned, normative authority it
embodies and extols, operates as a welcome check on the illegitimate
excesses and the irrationality and whimsy of the political "state," is
becoming a central tenet of modern conservative thought. 25
The legal conservative's deference to the authority of law on normative questions regarding the nature of the good typically rests on an
attitude not of respect toward the presumed wisdom behind dominant
legal normative authority, but rather of obedience tdward-the power
24. McConnell, supra note 2, at 1504 (citation omitted).
25. The most striking example in the legal literature is Epstein's demonstration in Takings of
the unconstitutionality, as well as irrationality, of the "New Deal" legislative reforms of the first
half of the century. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2. Bork criticizes Epstein on precisely this ground in
The Tempting of America. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 229-230. Bork's adamant originalism,
however, is more similar than dissimilar to Epstein's constitutional critique of redistributive politics. For Bork, as for Epstein, it is law, the original Constitution, and the reasoned, judicious
mindset its interpretation requires, that must take precedence over the political desires of presently constituted majorities. Only where the Constitution dictates majoritarian rule does Bork
allow the majority unfettered say.
For a general critique of the modem conservative's hostility toward politics, see Kelman, On
Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public
Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199 (1988).
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that, whether visible or not, inevitably underlies it. The motivational
difference, then, between moral conservatives and legal conservatives
is that whereas moral conservatives take a "respectful" deferential
stance toward a community's positive morality, legal conservatives
take an obedient or submissive stance toward the "legitimated" powerful voices of legal history - so long as those voices are in the sufficiently distant past to be distinguishable from the powerful voices of
the contemporary political state. Legitimate legal authority, for the
legal conservative, is not so much there to be respected for its wisdom
as it is to be obeyed. What the modern state actor (as well as citizen)
"ought" to do with his or her power, then, for the legal conservative, is
to relinquish it; what the state actor ought to do with freedom is not
simply to respect, but positively to obey, the dictates of lawful authority. Put differently, the way to make one's political will conform to
the requirements of political morality is to constrain political willfulness, and the way to constrain willfulness is to obey the dictates of
legal authority. 26
This second strand of conservative thought, and particularly the
attitudinal and ethical stance toward legal authority that undergirds it
- which I have discussed at length elsewhere27 - rests on an entirely
different ethical account of the relation between the individual and
communal authority than the first strand (with which it is often confused). Unlike respectful deference to the normative authority of
moral tradition, the justification for an obedient attitude to legal authority does not rest on the quasi-empirical McConnellian claim that
the moral actor, without relinquishing autonomy in any meaningful
sense, might nevertheless sensibly defer to lessons of the past. Rather,
the morality of submissive, obedient deference to legal authority is
typically defended instead on the ground that the authority of the legal
other is "legitimate" (rather than wise). For the legal conservative,
legal authority generates a near-absolute ethical duty of obedience so
long as that authority is "legitimate."28
26. For critiques of this strand of conservative thought, see Henderson, Authoritarianism
and the Rule of Law (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Sherry, The Ninth Amend·
ment, supra note 4, at 1010-11; Wilson, supra note 2, at 913; Wilson, Constraints of Power: The
Constitutional Opinions ofJudges Scalia, Bork, Posner, Easterbrook and Winter, 40 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1171 (1986). See also West, The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional Law, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 531 (1988).
27. See West, The Celebration ofAuthority (Book Review), 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 977 (1989);
West, supra note 26.
28. Richard Posner calls this moral outlook a "morality of obedience" and identifies it with
"mature values." See R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION
(1988). For a critical account of the morality of obedience as defended in Posner's work, see
West, The Celebration of Authority, supra note 27.
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For the legal conservative, legal authority can be "legitimated" and hence giv:e rise to a duty of obedience - in one of two ways:
either by the apparent or actual "consent of the governed" 29 or by the
distance of time. 30 If the imperative command behind the legal norm
has sufficiently receded in history, or is perceived as sufficiently "consensual" - even if the consent is the consent of the vanquished on a
distant battlefield - then the law becomes "legitimate": it is law,
rather than mere politics, and thus authoritative. 31 It is that which
actors have a moral duty to obey. The "legitimacy" of the power of
this distant military-victor-turned-legal-authority is then coupled with
the claim that a state actor's own power, or autonomy, is not to be
trusted; that the felt moral autonomy of individual state agents is, indeed, the core evil from which most political turmoil springs. Where
distant or past legal authority is legitimate, and the state actor's own
power is untrustworthy, then the moral thing for the state actor to do
with freedom is to relinquish it. The central ethical claim of the legal
conservative is that the moral state act is the obedient act, so long as
the legal authority being obeyed is legitimate. The central psychic disposition of the legal conservative is a felt imperative to relinquish
power and responsibility, and acquiesce instead in the power and authority of a totemized, triumphant, legalized Other.
Finally, for a third group - "libertarian conservatives" or "freemarket conservatives" - the source of social authority to which the
state should defer is the authority of actors and forces operating in
private economic markets. 32 For free-marke! conservatives, it is the
market, and the economic power to which it gives voice, that is the
sole legitimate source of normative authority. The political state
should accordingly defer to the normative authority of successful market processes and the economic power that underlies them. Motivationally, the free-market conservative's constitutive deferential stance
toward the authority of dominant market actors rests neither on respect nor obedience, but instead on a celebratory attitude toward economic authority, and toward the success, the triumph, the power, and
the strength evidenced by its ascendance. To the free-market conservative the will of the economic actor does not simply reflect value,
but rather constitutes value, and hence constitutes the "good" that the
29. See, e.g., McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.KENT L. REV. 89 (1988); Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979 (1987).
30. The longevity of the Constitution, for example, plays a major role in justifying the various forms of conservative legalism endorsed by Richard Posner. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note
28; see also McConnell, supra note 29; Meese, supra note 29.
31. For a critical account, see Sherry, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 4.
32. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2.
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state, basically through noninterference, has a duty to promote. Morally justifiable legislation should, then, reflect, mimic, or promote the
bargained-for outcomes of economic actors, rather than the political
or ethical visions of legislators, and morally justifiable adjudication
should uphold those legislatively encoded private and public bargains.
The ethical argument for this celebratory stance toward the will of
the economically powerful is some version of "moral Darwinism."
Moral Darwinism unabashedly asserts and celebrates the normative
rightness of economic power: for the moral Darwinist, at least in the
economic sphere, that which is, ought to be; that which endures, ought
to endure; that which lasts, ought to last; and that which triumphs,
rightly triumphs. Thus, celebratory, Darwinian, free-market conservatism rests explicitly on an awestruck and admiring stance toward
the power that underlies economic authority: we should defer to the
authority of the market, according to the moral Darwinian, because
market authority necessarily reflects a triumphant conquest of
strength over weakness, of power over impotence, and of that which is
over that which could have been - of existence over possibility. 33
Conservative political theory, then, is united by its antipathy to
state normative authority and preference for social authority, but conservative theorists differ over the particular social authority to which
the state should defer. Moralistic or social conservatives urge the state
to defer to the visions of the good embedded in a community's moral
institutions; legal conservatives view the legal system as the appropriate authority to which the state should turn; and free-market conservatives locate normativity in the outcomes generated by and the
preferences reflected in economic markets. All, however, view these
forms of authority as importantly higher or better than the normative
authority of "the state." All view the visions of the good and the good
life that they generate as superior to those reflected in the "mere preferences," desires, or will of state actors.
B.

Conservative Jurisprudence

Conservative political thought grounds, but does not directly compel, the core tenets of the conservative constitutional paradigm. Conservative constitutionalists, as noted above, are lawyers as well as
political th~orists, and as such, they adhere to some sort of jurisprudential position regarding the nature of law, as well as some sort of
conservative political theory regarding the legitimacy of social and
33. Some version of moral Darwinism pervades the writings of the normative wing of the law
and economics school, as well as modern public choice writings. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, supra
note 2; R. POSNER, supra note 2.
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state power. Constitutional theory is surely as indebted to jurisprudence as it is to politics. However, it would be a mistake to think that
those jurisprudential commitments that undoubtedly influence the
conservative constitutional paradigm have in any way "de-politicized"
the constitutional paradigm itself. Rather, the jurisprudence embraced by conservative constitutional thinkers, and which in tum
helps ground the conservative constitutional paradigm, is itself profoundly political. As this section attempts to show, the three conservative understandings, canvassed above, of the proper source of
communal normative authority for state action imply, in tum, distinctively conservative interpretations of our three major jurisprudential
traditions: natural law, positivism, and legal instrumentalism.
First, moral conservatism, and the respect for the community's
conventional morality on which it rests, implies a distinctively conservative interpretation of the natural law jurisprudential tradition.
For all natural lawyers, conservative and otherwise, those political
edicts that deserve to be called "law" must meet at least minimal
moral criteria. 34 Now this basic jurisprudential definition of the nature of law need not be conservative. The political consequences of the
natural lawyer's definitional claim depend entirely upon the content
and source of the "morality" the law must incorporate. Obviously, if
the 'moral criteria the law must definitionally meet (in order to be true
"law") is informed by the u:qrealized morality or ideals of the disenfranchised, natural law can be (and has been) profoundly revolutionary in its implication: the natural lawyer's claim then implies that
extant positive law that fails to meet the moral criteria, in some higher
sense, is not true "law'' at all, and hence carries with it no claim to ~he
people's allegiance.
For the moral conservative, however, the natural lawyer's identification of law with morality turns out to have profoundly conservative
con~equences .. For the moral conservative, the content of the '.'morality" that the law incorporates consists not of the unrealized aspirations
of .the disempowered, but rather of the community's authoritative
moral commitments and traditions. Therefore, for the moral conservative drawn to the natural law tradition, a society's law is properly
and explicitly - even necessarily - informed by the community's
traditional, conventional beliefs. Thus, for the conservative natural
lawyer--: such as, for example, England's Lon:l Devlin, or Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, or Professor Michael McConnell - a community's historical and "moral" .revulsion to homosexuality, its
34. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-91 (1964).
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abhorrence of abortion or interracial marriage, its endorsement of
traditional gendered roles, or its resistance to the commodification of
babies, sexuality, or reproductive services, might all properly inform
legislative governance. 35 Traditional morality - a community's dominant understandings of the content of the good life - is the form of
normative authority that properly informs and guides legislation.
Just as deference to the conventional morality of a community implies a conservative version of the natural law tradition, so the deference toward legal power which characterizes legal conservatism
implies an archly conservative version of legal positivism. For legal
positivists generally, unlike natural lawyers, the "law" is, definitionally, that which is spelled out in historically authoritative legal
sources. For the positivist, then, there is no definitional link between a
society's law and either its conventional or its aspirational morality.
Again, as with natural law, there is nothing necessarily conservative
about this positivistic understanding of law. The positivistic separation of law and morality is at least analytically helpful and arguably
necessary to establish the immorality of a particular law or legal regime, and hence the moral case for change. 36 When legal positivism is
combined with the obedient stance toward legal authority characteristic of legal conservatism, however, it becomes conservative and profoundly so. For all positivists, "law" is the product of historical,
political, and military victories - it is the will of the strong channeled
through processes themselves determined by the will of the strong, and
thereafter legitimated by tradition. But distinctively for legal conservatives, a duty to obey the "law" thus defined immediately follows: the
political and military victor whose will is expressed in law becomes the
legitimate and hence "legal" authority. The moral actor, whether
judge or citizen, when faced with a legal mandate, behaves morally by
disempowering himself through unstinting obedience.
Hence, the combination of legal conservatism and legal positivism
yields a strand of positivism that might best be called "conservative
positivism": For the conservative positivist, it is law itself (rather
than, as for the conservative natural lawyer, a community's conventional morality) that is and ought be the source of authority on questions regarding the nature of the good to which state actors ought
defer and which the state then has a duty to promote. When an agent
of the state, then, such as a court, seeks to inform legal interpretation
35. See, e.g., P. DEVLIN, supra note 23; McConnell, supra note 2. I do not mean to imply
that any of these individual theorists support these outcomes in particular.
36. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. R.Ev. 593, 620-21 (1958).
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by some conception of the good, it should do so by re-articulating a
conception of the good held by some higher or earlier "legitimate"
legal authority - such as a "founding father" - and then obeying
that mandate. 37 Again, the argument is not that such a conception
should be respected because its holder was wise. Rather, the conservative positivist's position, more simply, is that such a conception should
be obeyed because its holder was "legitimate."
Finally, the adoration, celebration, or, more simply, love of economic power characteristic of modern free-market conservatives implies an archly conservative version of legal pragmatism or
instrumentalism. Obviously, as the legal-realist experiments with instrumentalism and pragmatism established, legal instrumentalism, no
less than natural law or legal positivism, can be put to either radical,
liberal, or conservative political ends. For all instrumentalists, law is a
tool with which to achieve other independently defined purposes.
When legal pragmatism is combined with the politics of free-market
conservatism, however, the result is again a profoundly conservative
jurisprudential doctrine: what might be called "conservative instrumentalism." For the conservative instrumentalist, law should be organized in such a way as to promote free economic competition.
Economic competition - the process by which the wishes, instincts,
and desires of the strongest appropriately become the will of the community, and by which their perceptions of the world become the truth
about reality - is not just a fact or practice, but a normative principle
of modern life. Law, then, both adjudicative and otherwise, should be
used and interpreted in such a way as to promote best the substantive
values and norms of competitive life. 38 The consequence for decisionmaking is that when law must be informed or guided by a conception
of the good, it should embrace whatever decision will liberate
competition.
The relationship between conservative politics and conservative jurisprudence might be schematized in this way:
37. See Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 2; Easterbrook, A Reply, supra note 2, at 627-29.
Lon Fuller seemed to assume, in his debates with Hart, that a duty to obey the law followed
naturally from positivist premises. See L. FULLER, supra note 34, at 106-18. Some forms of
legal positivism lend themselves to this interpretation, legitimating the natural lawyer's complaint that legal positivism carries with it conservative and even authoritarian implications. See
Henderson, supra note 26.
38. See R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (forthcoming); R. POSNER, supra
note 2.
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Conservative Constitutionalism

The conservative interpretations of the Constitution now dominating Supreme Court adjudication and conservative academic commentary may or may not be mandated by the constitutional text itself or by
our constitutional history. If the last thirty years of substantive debate
over the meaning of constitutional clauses, the nature of the document
itself, and the possibilities the process of interpretation opens or forecloses has taught us anything at all, it should have taught us to be
skeptical of any such claim. What this Part shows, however, is simply
that whatever may be the interpretive status of the conservative paradigm, at least three of its core tenets - (1) the characteristically conservative denial that a "right to privacy" can be found in the
Constitution, and particularly in the liberty prong of the due process
clause; (2) the conservative insistence on a "color-blind" interpretation
of the equal protection clause and on a "formal" understanding of the
equality that clause protects, such that state or city-initiated affirmative action plans meant to eradicate the effects of societal discrimination are unconstitutional; and (3) an intentionalist view of
constitutional interpretation, such that the Court is not free to "discover" fundamental rights not clearly implied by the document's text
or history - follow immediately from the various conservative jurisprudential and political commitments outlined above. Whether or not
the text or history of constitutional law mandates these interpretations, in other words, conservative politics and conservative jurisprudence clearly do.
1. Privacy Jurisprudence

Let me start with the present Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence. Although the abortion debacle triggered by Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 39 presently dominates public consciousness of
39. 109

s. Ct. 3040 (1989).
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the Court's privacy jurisprudence, Bowers v. Hardwick4-0 is nevertheless more representative of the conservatives' distinctive ~nderstand
ing of the right to privacy and the liberty it is designed to protect.
Bowers, which predates Webster by three years, gives a far clearer articulation of the conservative jurisprudential premises that underlie
both decisions. In upholding the anti-sodomy statute at issue in Bowers, a majority of the Supreme Court, arguably for the first time in
modem constitutional history, embraced an explicitly conservative
political account of the meaning of the good, an explicitly conservative
jurisprudential account of the "natural" right of the community to
define and enforce the good in law, an explicitly conservative political
account of the normative weight of positive law, and an explicitly conservative jurisprudential account of the duty of courts and citizens
faithfully to obey the law. From a jurisprudential understanding of
law as definitionally incorporating morality and of the courts' and citizen's duty to obey it, and a political understanding of both the conventional nature of morality and the moral content of positive law, the
Court drew its profoundly conservative constitutional inference: legislation that reflects conventional morality is entirely proper and thus
must be fully constitutional, unless it conflicts with an explicit constitutional provision to the contrary.
To put the same point negatively, and more familiarly, the Court
in Bowers emphatically rejected the classically liberal account of the
relation oflaw to morality, the classically liberal trust of the individual
and correlative suspicion of "community," and hence the paradigmatically liberal inference that any 'legislation incorporating the community's conventional moral belief and thereby constraining individual
freedom is suspect. For classical liberals, it is the individual, not the
community, who is the authority on the nature of the good, not only
with respect to religious beliefs and political ideas (separately insulated
from community control by the first amendment), but also with respect to ways of life. Consequently, legislation that interferes with
such individual authority is strongly disfavored, and properly subject
to constitutional check. The obvious importance of Bowers is that it
was the first "privacy" case to reject definitively this classically liberal
and individualist account of the good, of law, and hence of the constitutional right to privacy, and adopt in its stead a conservative communitarian conception. In his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger rejected
liberal individualism unequivocally:
[T]he proscriptions against sodomy have very "ancient roots." Deci40. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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sions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to
state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian [sic]
moral and ethical standards. Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime
under Roman law.... Blackstone described "the infamous crime against
nature" as an offense of "deeper malignity" than rape, an heinous act
"the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature," and "a crime
not fit to be named ...." The common law of England, including its
·prohibition of sodomy, became the received law of Georgia and the other
Colonies. In 1816 the Georgia Legislature passed the statute at issue
here, and that statute has been continuously in force in one form or another since that time. To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is
somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.
.
This is essentially not a question of personal "preferences" but rather
of the legislative authority of the State. I find nothing in the Constitution depriving a State of the power to enact the statute challenged here. 41

In addition to the Court's rejection of liberal individualism, there is
another reason that Bowers is a central part of the emerging conservative paradigm of fourteenth amendment and due process law. The
opinion is central to modern conservatism not only because it tumbled
what was on the verge of becoming a hegemonic liberal interpretation
of the requirements of privacy, due process, and liberty - an interpretation that had dominated Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence for
almost two decades. The significance of Bowers is that it was not only
revolutionary, but it was also "integrative": it uniquely and cleanly
integrated two of the three competing - and potentially contradictory
- strands of modern conservative political and jurisprudential theory.
First, the result in Bowers, and Chief Justice Burger's concurrence
most dramatically, rests on an understanding of "liberty" and the due
process clause that gives constitutional backing both to the moral conservative's respect for a community's authoritative accounts of the
good, and to the conservative natural lawyer's belief that law should
embrace that positive morality. The "liberty" to which individuals are
legally entitled, to the conservative natural lawyer, is the liberty to live
the good life as determined by the traditional moral customs and
norms of the community itself and as reflected in its legislation, and
not, as for the classical liberal, the liberty to live the good life as determined by the individual's own lights. The individual does not have the
"liberty" to determine for herself the content of the good life and then
pursue it, for the simple reason that the "good life" according to the
conservative natural lawyer, is what the community's normative traditions have established it to be - and law properly and constitution41. 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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ally reflects that conception.42 "Liberty" therefore not only does not
include "privacy," it is antithetical to it: the liberty we enjoy is the
liberty to live a moral life as defined by the community's moral convictions. The Court in Bowers decisively endorsed this conservative understanding. The Court respectfully deferred to the normative
authority of the Georgia legislature, which had in turn deferred to the
conventional morality of the Georgian citizenry - to say nothing of
the normative authority of Roman Law, the classics, Blackstone, the
common law, and the Christian religion. From a conservative natural
lawyer's perspective, the "political state" of Georgia had acted entirely
properly in a moral sense as well as in a constitutional one: it enacted
legislation that articulated and deferred to the wisdom of the community's normative authority.
Second, the Court's reasoning in Bowers is at least as rigorously
positivistic as its result is moralistic, and the case is for that reason
alone likely to be as appealing to conservative legalists and positivists
as its result is to conservative natural lawyers. Justice White's opinion
in particular makes clear that not only should conventional morality
be respected by legislators, but that furthermore, the Constitution is a
law to be obeyed by Courts. Only the judgments contained in the
Constitution itself have "authority." All else is nothing but the Justices' own value judgments and hence lacks legitimacy. White
explained:
This case does not require a judgfi/.ent on whether laws against sodomy
between consenting adults in gene~al, or between homosexuals in particular, are wise or desirable. It raises no question about the right or propriety of state legislative decisions to repeal their laws that criminalize
homosexual sodomy, or of state court decisions invalidating those laws
on state constitutional grounds. The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that
still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.
The case also calls for some judgment about the limits of the Court's role
in carrying out its constitutional mandate.
. . . [R]espondent would have us announce, as the Court of Appeals
did, a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are
quite unwilling to do.
. . . The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with judge-made constitutiona1 law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. That this is
so was painfully demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive and
42. P. DEVLIN, supra note 23, Chapter I.
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the Court in the 1930's, which resulted in the repudiation of much of the
substantive gloss that the Court had placed on the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. There should be, therefore,
great resistance to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further
authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority.
The claimed right pressed on us today falls far short of overcoming this
resistance. 43

Both the Georgia legislature's and the Constitution's sovereign authority are to be obeyed, then, no less than should the wisdom they incorporate be respected. Bowers thus satisfies not only the need to respect
tradition central to conservative natural law, but the equally central
search for legitimate authority critical to conservative positivism. It
affirms both the centrality of communal tradition to the development
of morality, and also the centrality of law to legitimate political
authority.
Of the major strands of conservative political and jurisprudential
thought, only conservative instrumentalists will dispute the Bowers result. Conservative instrumentalists cannot unequivocally support the
Georgia legislature's attempt to cut off experimental social competition between competing lifestyles and sexual orientations. Bowers
dampens competition between lifestyles, no less than the legislation at
issue in Lochner 44 dampened competition in economic markets. It is
worth noting, though, that on another level - perhaps a deeper level
- the opinion is profoundly pro-competitive, even though, so far as I
know, no conservative instrumentalist has explicitly supported the
outcome on this rationale. By upholding the Georgia legislature, the
Court in effect embraced a competitive, and rejected a hedonistic, understanding of the nature of human sexuality. Nonreproductive, pleasure-seeking, hedonistic sexuality only impedes reproductive
competition. The outcome in Bowers, like the legislation it sustains,
can surely be read as an endorsement of the pro-competitive, "biological market"-based understanding of reproduction propounded by conservative sociobiologists, and a simultaneous rejection of a hedonistic,
pleasure-based understanding of our sexual practices.
If all of this is right, then Bowers is destined to become as central
to conservative dominance over the next few decades as Brown v.
Board ofEducation 45 was to liberalism during the last few. In Bowers,
the Court managed in just a few pages to incorporate at least two and
43. 478 U.S. at 190-91, 194-95.
44. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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perhaps three of the competing strands of conservative constitutionalism into a coherent whole: it respected the normative authority of the
community to propound on matters of conventional private morality,
obeyed the positive law of both the Georgia legislature and the overarching will of the constitutional founders, and at the same time, at
least arguably celebrated the biological competition between members
of the species to which reproductive heterosexuality, in contrast to hedonistic homosexuality, is conducive. Bowers achieved what Lochner
could not: a positivistic, obedient Court upheld a statute backed by
what the Court perceived to be the dominant moral sense of the community. Bowers, then, unlike either the majority or the dissenting
opinion in Lochner, is paradigmatically conservative. It was not only
the vehicle for the triumph of conservative over liberal values on the
Supreme Court; Bowers did something more deeply ideological than
that - it synthesized and accommodated multiple strands of modern
conservative constitutionalism.
A sizeable number of recent Supreme Court cases - including
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 46 Deshaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, 47 Penry v. Lynaugh, 48 Stanford
v. Kentucky, 4 9 and Michael H. v. Gerald D. 50 - cleanly fit the Bowers
"model": in each of these cases, regardless of the doctrinal right at
issue, the Court interpreted the constitutional language in such a way
as to underscore both the Court's positivist obligation to obey the constitutional mandate, and the state's right and obligation to enact legislation embracing the normative authority of the community's
conventional morality. Thus, in Webster, the Court held that the Constitution's protection of individual privacy and reproductive freedom
does not restrict the state's power to define the "beginnfug of life" by
reference to (its view of) the community's conventional morality. 51 In
DeShaney, the Court further limited the scope of the liberty protected
by due process, and in so doing, extended deferential respect to the
normative authority of the family. 52 The Court in effect held that the
due process clause does not require the state to invade the family's
"separate sphere" of political authority on behalf of an individual's
safety. In Stanford and Penry, the Court held that the eighth amend46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
109 s. Ct. 998 (1989).
109 s. Ct. 2934 (1989).
109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3040.
Deshaney, 109 S. Ct. 998.
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ment does not restrict the right of the state to decide whether and
when to execute juveniles and the mentally retarded (respectively) by
reference to community standards, 53 and in Michael H. that a biological but nonlegal father has no constitutional right against the power of
the community to decide the contours of the "nuclear family." 54 In
each of these cases, the Court combined conservative-positivist methodology with conservative natural law results to reach paradigmatically conservative readings of individual rights embodied in the
fourteenth and eighth amendments: what the liberty-due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees, according to these
cases, is only that the state may not (without providing due process)
deprive the individual of the liberty to live the good life as defined by
the community's moral traditions, and what the cruel and unusual
punishment clause ensures is that individuals will not be subjected to
cruel punishments, where cruelty is defined, roughly, as out of line
with the community's "moral sense."
The Court's conservative due process jurisprudence, then, might
be summarized in this way. The due process clause, according to the
conservative jurists, cannot and does not, in any way, restrict, constrain, define, or guide the community's authority to dictate, by reference to whatever traditions have become dominant, the content of the
life that individuals must be free to enjoy, unimpeded by illegal process. By this view, to identify and define "the good life" is definitionally the community's natural right and moral responsibility, and it is
consequently the Court's positive legal and political duty to defer to
that communal authority Qimited by other constitutional provisions,
notably the first amendment). The due process clause grants rights to
individuals and accordingly restrains communitarian will, but the
right granted is only the right to pursue the community-defined good
unimpeded by illegal state action, and the power restrained is only the
power of the state to deprive the individual illegally of the liberty that
the state, by reference to the community's authoritative conventional
traditions, has deemed compatible or necessary to pursuit of the good
life and the good society. The legislature, and through it the community, and through the community authoritative traditions, remain empowered to define the content of the good life (and hence the content
of evil) and legislate accordingly. Constitutional restraints leave the
authority of tradition and its authoritative power over our lives intact.
53. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2969; Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2934.
54. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2342-47.
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Equality Jurisprudence

City ofRichmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 55 decided last Term, may well
be the conservative Court's paradigm equal protection clause case,
destined to become as central to the conservatives' developing understanding of equality doctrine as is Bowers to due process. As others
have argued, and as countless others no doubt will argue in the near
future, the minimalist understanding of equal protection rendered by
the Court in Croson cannot be traced to any neutral reading of either
political history or constitutional law. 56 What I want to argue here is
the somewhat different point that Croson can readily and easily be
traced to conservatism's political and jurisprudential premises.
First, and most obviously, the result in Croson (rather than the
reasoning) is a conservative instrumentalist's triumph, no less than the
result in Bowers was a conservative natural lawyer's victory. For the
free-market conservative, race ought not to be a determinant of legislative decisionmaking that affects the success of individuals in competitive economic markets - regardless of whether the motive for such
legislation is benign or malignant - because and to the degree that
race is not a rational proxy for any characteristic that could conceivably be of relevance to the competitive process. For the conservative
instrumentalist, the purpose of law should be to free economic competition, so that economic power can prevail unimpeded by extrinsic
considerations. The equal protection clause should therefore be read
in such a way as to further this purposive mandate. Discriminatory,
race-conscious legislation generally inhibits rather than furthers competition, and hence trenches on competitive values. If competitive rationality is the purpose - and therefore the meaning - of equality
and of equal protection, it obviously makes no difference whether the
discriminatory legislation is malignant or benign - either way it inhibits competition. The result in Croson is substantially in accord.
Thus, Justice O'Connor's summary of the Court's holding emphasizes
both the value of competition and conservative instrumental themes:
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[N]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws".... As this Court has noted in the past,
the "rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment
SS. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
S6. Casebeer, Running on Empty: Justice Brennan's Plea, The Empty State, the City of Richmond, and the Profession, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 989, 1007 (1989); Delgado, On Taking Back Our
Civil Rights Promises: When Equality Doesn't Compute, 1989 WIS. L. REV. S79; Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87
MICH. L. REv. 1729 (1989); Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal
Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989).
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are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are
personal rights." The Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportu-

nity to compete for a fixed percentage ofpublic contracts based solely upon
their race. To whatever racial group these citizens belong, their "personal rights" to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated
by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public
decisionmaking.
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such racebased measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics.... We thus reaffirm the view expressed by the plurality in Wygant that the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is
not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification. 57

For the conservative positivist as well, the decision is a victory. As
the concurring opinions of Justices Scalia and Kennedy were at pains
to establish, no distanced, historical "other" has ever "legitimated,"
through military, political, or judicial victory, the quest for substantive
racial equality in this country's history. 58 Substantive racial equality
- the clear goal of affirmative action - is simply not a part of the
normative authority of our positive constitutional law. Formal racial
equality - the neutrality standard under which affirmative action
laws are struck down - by contrast, is. Thus, the conservative positivist, like the conservative instrumentalist, will endorse a reading of
equal protection that precludes benign as well as malicious uses of race
in legislative decisionmaking, but the reason will be different: for the
conservative instrumentalist, such a reading furthers competition; for
the conservative positivist, such a reading is commanded by the Constitution. As Justice Scalia explained:
The benign purpose of compensating for social disadvantages, whether
they have been acquired by reason of prior discrimination or otherwise,
can no more be pursued by the illegitimate means of racial discrimination than can other assertedly benign purposes we have repeatedly rejected.... The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination
is as nothing compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society
the source of those effects, which is the tendency - fatal to a nation such
as ours - to classify and judge men and women on the basis of their
country of origin or the color of their skin. A solution to the first problem that aggravates the second is no solution at all. I share the view
expressed by Alexander Bickel that "[t]he lesson of the great decisions of
the Supreme Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the
same for at least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of
57. 109 S. Ct. at 720-21 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
58. 109 S. Ct. at 734-39 (Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J., concurring).
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democratic society."s9

The conserva~ive naturiil lawyers' support of Croson is considerably more tentative, as is reflected in both the tone and content of Justice O'Connor's opinion. For O'Connor as well as for other
conservative natural lawyers, the moral sense of the community, as
expressed through its legislature, is the proper source of authority on
issues concerning the good. It would seem to follow that if the community has embraced substantive race equality as a desirable legislative goal, that commitment should be respected. The only limit to this
principle (and_ the equal protection clause is surely a limit) for the conservative natural lawyer must come not from an abstract commitment
to a particular understanding of "equality" as constitutive of the good
that conflicts with communitarian conceptions, but rather, from limits
on the community's normative authority: if history has proven the
community untrustworthy with respect to some aspect of its authority
to define the good, then to that degree, the community has lost its
claim to authority. The meaning of "equal protection" should, then,
be derived from a moralistic understanding of the limits on the community's normative authority, not from any understanding of equality
itself.
Because history has proven the local community's authority on the
nature of the good untrustworthy in matters regarding race, O'Connor
reasoned, benign as well as malicious racial categorizations made by
local and state governments are clearly unconstitutional. The state
and muriibipal community - otherwise ·authoritative - cannot' be
trusted with racially explicit classifications, whether they be in the service of apartheid or in the service of affinllative action:
That Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination does not mean that, a fortiori the States and their political
subdivisions are free to decide that such remedies are appropriate. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is an explicit constraint on state
power, and the States must undertake any remedial effort;s in accordance
with that provision. To hold otherwise would be to cede control over the
c~ntent of the Equal Protection Clause to the 50 state legislatures and
their myriad political subdivisions. The mere recitation of a benign or
compensatory purpose for the use of a racial classification would essentiatly entitle the States to exercise the full power of Congress under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment and insulate any racial classification from
judicial scrutiny under§ 1. We believe that such a result would be contrary to the intentions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment,
who desired to place clear limits on the States' use of race as a criterion
for legislative action, and to have the federal courts enforce those
59. 109 S. Ct. at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting A._ BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CoNSENT 133 (1975)).
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limitations. 60

Thus, to summarize, equality means "formal equality" and no
more in the conservative paradigm, just as "due process" means protection against procedural illegality and procedural illegality only.
For conservative theorists and jurists, the equal protection clause protects the individual's right not to be irrationally discriminated against
by state officials: like individuals must be treated alike by the legislature as well as in the market, no less than like cases must be treated
alike by judges. Racial classifications are irrational classifications, or
should be presumed to be such, because they breach this formal justice
mandate - similar individuals are treated differently - and are accordingly unconstitutional. The clause does no more than this. It
does not guarantee, in any way, a right to substantive social or economic equality. It does not guarantee or even suggest that states
should take action to ameliorate the substantive inequality suffered by
particular historical groups during the country's history. The right
granted is an individual right to be free of the effects of legislation that
categorizes on the basis of irrational factors, such as race or, in some
circumstances, gender. It neither recognizes nor protects group grievances, group histories, or group entitlements.
In this decade, what this conservative interpretation of equality
means, most importantly, is that other than in truly extraordinary circumstances, no individual's or corporation's competitive chances in
the marketplace will be compromised by societal efforts to put an end
to the substantive, subordinating effects of private, social, or institutional racism through anticompetitive affirmative action programs.
The clause thus construed protects not equality so much as the integrity of the competitive process, and targets not racism (to say nothing
of classism, misogyny, or heterosexism), but race-conscious governmental decisionmaking. The conservative's conception of the guarantee of equality thus has nothing to do with putting an end to racism if
"racism" is understood as the white majority's hatred, contempt, and
subordination of nonwhites, and little if anything to do with achieving
equality. Rather, it has everything to do with protecting competitive
values against progressive political attempts by the state to do so.
3.

Constitutional Interpretation

Finally, two central and arguably inconsistent propositions about
the nature and scope of constitutional interpretation are paradigmatically conservative: first, that the Constitution should be interpreted in
60. 109 S. Ct. at 719.
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such a way as to give effect to the meaning most likely intended by its
authors ("intentionalism" or "originalism"), 61 and second, that in the
absence of clear constitutional authority to the contrary, the Court
should defer whenever possible to legislative will. 62 Most conservatives subscribe to one or the other of these two claims, and many, if
not most, subscribe to both. Interpretation, for the conservative constitutionalist, is a matter of ascertaining the original meaning of the
Constitution, and in cases of doubt, deferring to legislative judgment.
Judicial restraint and originalism constitute the core of a conservative
theory of constitutional interpretation.
At first glance, this dual endorsement of judicial restraint and
originalism is hard to rationalize: it is not clear why a strict originalist
would advocate judicial restraint over judicial activism - either, from
time to time, might be necessary to achieve the original intent of the
Framers. Nor is it at all clear why an advocate of judicial restraint
would insist upon obedience to original intent. The conservative approach to interpretation, in other words, seems to flow from neither a
commitment to majoritarian democracy nor an adherence to strict
constitutionalism. When viewed as an outgrowth of the politics and
jurisprudence of conservatism, however, it is less mysterious why so
many conservatives try to hold both commitments.
First, the two imperatives within the conservative view of constitutional interpretation - that courts should interpret the Constitution
narrowly so as to effectuate the will of its authors, and that the courts
should whenever possible defer to legislative will - are each directly
responsive to the need for obedience to legitimated authority that
drives conservative positivism. First, originalism compellingly satisfies
the conservative positivist's quest for legitimated authority. The original Constitution, to the conservative positivist, is a legal document laid
down by earlier embodied political sovereigns in positions to command, is therefore "legitimate," and should be construed accordingly.63 Consequently, the conservative positivist will read the
Constitution wherever possible as a command that does and should
trigger an attitude of obedience. The Constitution is not, for the conservative positivist, a "text" requiring active, creative, and hence morally responsible interpretation by particular judges within the context
of particular historical circumstances. Rather, the text is a command
within a hierarchy of commands, to which the judge's only distinc61. See, for example, the work of Raoul Berger, cited supra note 2, and Robert Bork, cited
supra note 2.
62. See R. BORK, supra note 2; Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 2.
63. See R. BORK, supra note 2; Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 2.
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tively moral duty is one of unflinching obedience. The judge's moral
duty, then, is exhausted by his duty to obey; judicial morality is a
"morality of obedience." The judge behaves morally by obeying authority, rather than capriciously acting on his or her "own" values.
Judicial restraint similarly satisfies the psychic and ethical mandate of obedience that drives conservative positivism. Judicial restraint continues to be a central commitment of conservative
positivism, not for the narrowly political reason that the judiciary's
politics are substantively at odds with conservatism - for this is
clearly no longer the case - but rather for the deeply political reason
that it is the lawmaking, imperativist activity of legislation, rather
than the deliberative work of adjudication, that gives rise to imperatives that invite obedience. The conservative positivist judge will tend
to construe th~ more general and less imperative provisions of the
Constitution narrowly, so as to maximize deference to - and hence
obedience to - the legislative will. The legislator is an embodied authority speaking in unambiguously imperative language. Where the
constitutional command can be traced to equally clear and clearly imperative authority it will surely trump; but where the constitutional
text does not do so - where it neither appears nor operates as an
imperative command, and where the "embodiment" of its authority is
unclear - the conservative judge will read it narrowly, so as to retain
the form and substance of a hierarchic, legalistic structure of
command.
The Court, then, as a state actor, should obey rather than act;
should defer rather than interpret; should acquiesce in authority
rather than question it. The Court (like all moral agents) should defer
to, or submit to, the law, as established by the legislature or the constitutional founders - not because the legislature or the founders were
necessarily wise, but rather because the power on which their author, ity rests is legitimate. Judge Easterbrook defends both conservative
legal positivism and the legal conservative's constitutive stance of obedience in the judicial realm in this representative passage:
[T]he proper judicial role combines honest interpretation of decisions
made elsewhere with careful discharge of powers expressly granted....
Judges have no authority to reconstitute the values of the people or to
exalt redistribution at the expense of competing objectives selected by the
political branches.... The Constitution demands that all power be authorized.... Judges applying the Constitution we have, rather than the
one Professor Tribe wishes we had, must take their guidance and authority from decisions made elsewhere. Otherwise they speak with the same
authority they and Professor Tribe and I possess when we fill the law
reviews with our speculations and desires: none. And the other
branches owe no obedience to those who speak without authority.
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This is not to say that the judicial process is mechanical. Far from
it. ... Knowledge is ephemeral, and doubts about both the meaning of
words and the effects of rules tax the greatest interpreters. But none of
this changes the source of the power to decide. Judges can legitimately
demand to be obeyed only when their decisions stem from fair interpretations of commands laid down in the texts. 64

It is not surprising, then, that conservative positivists are drawn to
principles of interpretation mandating both originalism and judicial
restraint. The reason this is so, however, is not narrowly political in
the sense often meant by critics of intentionalism. It is, however, political in a deeper sense: for positivist conservatives, a Constitution, like
a statute, is there to be obeyed. The Constitution binds just as the law
commands; they are both authoritative; they constitute our capacity
for self-rule. That a rigid intentionalism and originalism dominates
conservative constitutionalism thus has everything to do with the conservative need and desire to constrain one's freedom and hence moral
responsibility by submitting to and obeying legitimated authority. The
conservative positivist's insistence that the Constitution must be construed and obeyed in accordance with the intent of its Framers - that
the Constitution must be "obeyed," not freely interpreted - follows
inexorably from the psychic need to constrain choice, freedom, fluidity, motion, and the will to power, with prior, objective, and controlling authority.
A strand of moral conservatism as well supports the centrality of
both judicial restraint and strict originalism to the interpretive model
at the core of the conservative paradigm. The evident wisdom, intelligence, and vast practical and historical knowledge of the "Founding
Fathers" ought surely to be respected. Somewhat less obviously, however, the legislature also constitutes, at least in its ideal form, a group
whose substantive judgments command respect. Moralistic conservatives and conservative natural lawyers thus have independent reasons
to endorse both originalism and judicial restraint, although their support for these interpretive commitments is more likely to be ambivalent than that of conservative positivists - precedent, or the common
law tradition, constitutes, for the moralistic conservative, an important competing body of accumulated wisdom, and the wisdom of precedent may of course diverge from the wisdom of original intent, and
may counsel considerable judicial activism. This may not, however, be
as great a conflict as first appears. As moral conservatives correctly
note, constitutional decisions, with only rare exceptions, are in fact far
less likely to deal meaningfully with underlying moral issues than is
64. Easterbrook, A Reply, supra note 2, at 627-29.
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commonly supposed. Thoughtful moral conservatives are accordingly
skeptical of the "precedential wisdom" of judicial decisions, and are
more inclined to value the culmination of wisdom expressed in moments of legislative and constitutional enactment. As Professor McConnell explained:
[J]udicial decisionmaking contains very little serious deliberation on
moral issues. In the abortion decision, for example, the Court majority
thought it "need not resolve" the moral-legal status of the unborn child
... while the dissenters devoted their entire opinion to issues of standing
to sue and the power of the states.... Bowers v. Hardwick, which dealt
with state power to regulate private consensual sexual conduct,
presented an unedifying face-off between a majority that believed the
claims of homosexuals to sexual autonomy were "at best, facetious," and
dissenters who reflexively equated longstanding religious moral teaching
with "religious intolerance," without pausing to reflect on its possible
moral underpinnings.... [T]he discussion of gay rights in and around
the Chicago City Council bad more substance than the opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick The Court's treatment of other prominent moral-constitutional questions. . . has not been much better. . . .
Nor ... has there been much more moral deliberation behind the
curtains. The Justices are far too busy to spend much time thinking
about the cases.... In contrast to the months, even years, that are devoted to major legislative deliberation, the Justices devote one hour to
oral argument and somewhat less than that to discussion at conference. 6S

For obvious reasons, the dual principles of originalism and judicial
restraint do not resonate nearly as strongly with conservative instrumentalism. For the conservative instrumentalist, the Constitution,
like all law, should be interpreted so as to free economic competition,
not so as to effectuate the will of either founders or legislators, and this
will often require considerable judicial activism in the face of legislation inhibiting economic competition. Free-market libertarianism, as
is increasingly well understood, requires considerable judicial activism
and seems to mandate legislative rather than judicial restraint.
Nevertheless, even conservative instrumentalists can find some reason to support the principles of judicial restraint and original intent.
As Holmes' famous dissent in Lochner 66 makes clear, judicial restraint
in the face of legislative will facilitates not only judicial submission to
the imperatives of legislation, but also frees competitive victories albeit of a political, rather than economic, stripe. For Holmes, as for
some of his present-day moral-Darwinian followers, the legislature, no
less than the market, constitutes a sphere of competitive normativity.
Post-Holmesian moral-Darwinian conservatives are therefore under65. McConnell, supra note 2, at 1536-37.
66. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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standably split not only over the value of judicial restraint, but also
over the value of Holmes' famous Lochner dissent: on the one hand,
an activist judiciary could overturn anticompetitive legislation, thus
freeing competition and competitive market outcomes, but on the
other hand (as Holmes' dissent argued), legislation is itself (at least at
times) the outcome of competitive processes, and when it is, an activist
court that upsets those outcomes is undermining, rather than furthering, competitive values and competitive victories. 67 For the instrumental moral-Darwinian conservative - who views the public
competition of interests and ideologies regarding the nature of the
good that is characteristic of legislation as of greater consequence to
the struggle for survival than the competition of wealth, skills, and
talents in private markets - judicial restraint will be a constitutional
imperative, even in the face of anticompetitive legislation. Particularly
where legislation is the product of economic-styled bargaining, the
legislature's will ought to remain untrammeled: legislative will ought
to trump not only the conflicting outcomes that competitive markets
would dictate, but also the conflicting principles that moralistic courts
might wronghandedly seek to enforce. At least a strand; then, of
moral-Darwinian conservatism supports rather than contests the primacy of judicial _restraint to the conservative paradigm.
Thus, .conservatives converge on an originalist-judicial restraint
understanding of constitutional interpretation and support the outcomes in Bowers 68 and Croson, 6 9 although for different reasons. The
developing conservative constitutional paradigm, and the divergent
reasons for its conservative support, might be schematized in this way:
Moralistic,
Natural Law
lmperativist
Positivism

Interpretation
(Originalist/restraint)

Liberty
(Bowers)

Respect for wisdom of founders/
legislators

Respect for religious teachings;
community's
traditions
Obedience to
Georgia legislative
& constitutional
mandate
Celebration of proreproductive, competitive sexuality

Obedience to legitimate legislative
& constitutional
commands
Competitive
Celebration of
Instrumentalism legis. & constitutional outcomes as
products of normative competition
67.
and R.
68.
69,

Equality
(Croson)
Respect for the
limits of community's wisdom
Obedience to
constitutional
imperative
Celebration of
competitive
processes over.
substantive
equality

In this regard, see Posner's discussion of Lochner in R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 281-88,
PosNER, supra note 2, at 383-86.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
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THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM

A. Progressive Political Theory
Mopem progressive political theory begins with a central, even definitive, insight: conservative deference to communal authority whatever form it takes - directly implies a parallel deference to the
clusters of social power that invariably underlie it. 7° Communal "authorltie8" on how we ought to live - whether they be moral, legal, or
economic - no less than the state authorities so distrusted by conservative theorists, are "authoritative" not because they are necessarily
right (although they may be) but because they have, use, reflect, and
wield social power. They may have power, in tum, because they are
right (and thus have survived centuries of critical inquiry) or, as Foucault's social "archeologies" have aimed to reveal, they may have
power for some other reason, such as that they serve the interests of
dominant social groups. 71 In any case, normative authority rests on
some form of social power. The authority of the market to dictate
what is and is not of value is directly dependent upon the power of
particular market actors to shape the preferences of others. 72 Similarly, the nonnative authority of the rule of law to demand obedience
to lawful authority is dependent upon the power of the legal system to
coerce, where need be, its mandates. 73 Lastly, the authority of the
community to dictate particular moral values is dependent upon some
part of the community achieving sufficient power so as to transform its
"will" ~to received "wisdom." 74 In all three cases, when the conservative embraces, preserves, respects, and defers to the teachings of
communal authority, he or she necessarily, whether or not intentionally, embraces the social power that underlies it. Tlius, progressives
conclude, political and jurisprudential conservative thought rests not
only on attitudes of deference to a community's normative authority,
70. That communal authority is premised on social power is an organizing tenet of critical
theory. See, e.g., M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977)
[hereinafter M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE]; M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1978)
[hereinafter M. FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY]. For parallel arguments in the legal literature, see M.
KELMAN, supra note 3, at 213-33, and Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57,
71-116 (1984).
71. See, e.g., M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 70; M. FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, supra
note 70.
72. See M. KELMAN, supra note 3, at 151-85.
73. This is, of course, the central insight of the Critical Legal Studies movement. See, e.g..
EssAYS ON CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Harvard Law Review Association ed. 1986); Kairys,
Introduction, THE POLITICS OF LAW 5 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Critical Legal Studies Symposium,
36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
74. See generally B. SMITH, CONTINGENC!Es OF VALUE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES
FOR CRITICAL THEORY (1988).
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but also on attitudes of deference toward the social power that underlies it.
· Progressivism, in part, defines itself in opp~sition to this conservative deference toward social power. Progressive political theory is
grounded in feelings of antipathy and resistance, rather than attraction, to both social authority and social power. ~rogiessives reject
both the wisdom and often the legitimacy of the normative authority
that emanates from social institutions, including the three particular
institutions that presently dominate conservative political and legal
thought: the community's conventional morality, its positive law, and
its economic markets. According to progressives, state actors,
whether legislators or adjudicators, should not defer to the normative
authority that rests on those sources when deciding how to act. Instead, progressives argue, state actors should rely upon the experiences, ideals, and aspirations of the relatively disempowered, rather
than the established traditions or customs of the socially empowered.
The progressive is thus willing to countenance state action designed to
disrupt patterns of social hierarchy, just as the conservative is typically
quite willing to countenance state action designed to reinforce those
patterns.
The particular experiences of the disempowered to which the progressive turns, however, and their reasons for doing so, diverge, just as
conservatives split on the type of community authority to which, in
their view, state actors ought to defer. Again, it is useful to distinguish
at least three major strands of progressive political thought - and
three correlative jurisprudential movements - all of which have had
an impact on progressive constitutional theorists.
First, for some progressives, the meaning of the good and hence
the content of the "good life" that should be the goal of state action
should be understood by reference to a set of ideals that derive from
the experiences and aspirations of the relatively disempowered. These
progressives; whom I call "idealistic progressives," identify the con~
tent of their progressive politics - the meaning of the "good life" that
citizens must have the right to pursue and that the state has an obligation to encourage - by reference to a particular utopian vision of social life which is in tum grounded in those experiences: a world in
which each individual enjoys some degree of meaningful individual autonomy, some degree of life-fulfilling rather than life-threatening connection to others, and freedom from fear of oppression, want, violence,
or subordination. 75 To make such a life possible for all citizens, ac75. See generally J. MILL, supra note 7. For an argument that modem liberals fail to read
Mill correctly, that his theory is progressive and requires the state to engage in discrimination
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cording to idealistic progressives, is and should be the proper aim of
state action.
The "experiences" that inform this utopian vision of the good, for
the idealistic progressive, are not culled from the lessons of objective
tradition, as for the moralistic conservative; rather, they are derived
from the experiences - which may include memories, glimpses, or
dreams - of true freedom or equality that occur "in the interstices"
(as it were) of a daily life constructed for the most part within conditions of hierarchy, inequality, subordination, and bondage. Let me offer two examples of progressive thought explicitly defined and
informed by such interstitial moments; one more familiar, one less so.
In both cases, the moral reasoning contrasts sharply with the conservative "idealistic" method outlined for "thoughtful people" by
Michael McConnell. 76
First, along with a number of radical feminists, lesbian feminist
Adrienne Rich has argued eloquently and persuasively that the widespread participation of women in practices of heterosexuality, family,
and motherhood is best explained as a product not of nature or biology, nor of benign culture, and certainly not of individual choice, but
rather as a product of patterns of coercion, gendered hierarchy, sexual
violence, and male control of women's sexual and reproductive labor
- patterns that transcend culture, race, and era. 77 What is distinctive
about Rich's work - what distinguishes it from other radical feminist
writings on the same topic - is her explicit reliance on women's "aspirational experiences" - fleeting, occasional, generally unrecorded,
and often distrusted, even by the woman herself- of a better, fuller,
"woman-identified" and woman-bonded emotional, spiritual, and, at
times, erotic life. It is this reliance on interstitial experiences of true
liberty and equality that renders Rich's work idealistic and gives her
argument its moral core. It is because women experience these fleeting, interstitial moments of freedom from male coercion, Rich suggests, that we can be confident that patriarchy and its attendant sexual
violence are indeed very real obstacles to the enjoyment of the good
life. Rich calls these experiences, collectively, the "lesbian continuum" and argues that virtually all women, at some point in their lives,
between conceptions of the good life, see West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition
of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PITI. L. REV. 673, 688-93 (1985).
76. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
77. A. RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS AND SILENCE: SELECTED PROSE, 1966-1978 (1979); see
also A. DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987); A. DWORKIN, WOMAN-HATING (1974); c. MACKIN·
NON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 4.
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have an experience of nondominated life that at least tangentially
touches that continuum:
I mean the term lesbian continuum to include a range - through each
woman's life and throughout history - of woman identified experience,
not simply the fact that a woman has had or consciously desired genital
experience with another woman. If we expand it to embrace many more
forms of primary intensity between and among women, including the
sharing of a rich inner life, the bonding against male tyranny, the giving
and receiving of practical and political support . . . we begin to grasp
breadths of female history and psychology which have lain out of reach
as a consequence of limited, mostly clinical, definitions of lesbianism.
Lesbian existence comprises both the breaking of a taboo and the
rejection of a compulsory way of life. It is also a direct or indirect attack
on male right of access to women. But it is more than these, although we
may first begin to perceive it as a form of naysaying to patriarchy, an act
of resistance.... The destruction of records and memorabilia and letters
documenting the realities of lesbian existence must be taken very seriously as a means of keeping heterosexuality compulsory for women,
since what has been kept from our knowledge is joy, sensuality, courage,
and community, as well as guilt, self-betrayal and pain. 78
The second, and more familiar, example comes from Martin Luther King's writing and oratory. King's thought was not just "progressive" in its opposition to racial hierarchy. It was also, like Rich's,
idealistic in its method: King's conviction that a life lived in a world
free of racial hierarchy would indeed be a better life was explicitly
informed not only by traditions culled from religious his~ory, but also
by occasional experiences, religious visions, and "dreams" of a utopian
future. It was these interstitial moments and dreams, for King, that
gave him confidence that a life free of the damaging effects of racism
would indeed be better, for both the individual and the community:
I have a dream that one day even the state of Mississippi, a desert
state sweltering with the heat of injustice and oppression, will be transformed into an oasis of freedom and justice.
I hav.e a dream that my four little children will one day live in a
nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the
content of their character.
I have a dream today.
I have a dream that one day the state of Alabama, whose governor's
lips are presently dripping with the words of interposition and nullification, will be transformed into a situation where little black boys and
black girls will be able to join hands with little white boys and white girls
and walk together as sisters and brothers.
I have a dream today.
I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, every hill
.

78. Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and the Lesbian Continuum, in
51-52 (1986) (emphasis added to last sentence).
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and mountain shall be made low, the rough places will be made plains,
and the crooked places will be made straight, and the glory of the Lord
shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together. 79

These experiences of the ideal "in the interstices" of everyday lives
of subordination and domination, occasional and fleeting as they may
be, are arguably essential to any progressive movement: they are the
basis of the conviction that there is another possible life, and a life that
is qualitatively better than the life defined and constrained by the social hierarchy of the present. Without such idealistic experiences, the
progressive insight that a present social reality is riddled with hierarchy and power imbalances runs the risk of triviality - it is hard to
imagine a social reality that is not. Idealism that relies directly on
interstitial experiences of true liberty and equality is thus one way
(which is not to deny that there are others) by which the progressive
can assert the normative superiority of a more egalitarian and less hierarchical social life, and thus one way that progressivism becomes a
normative and moral vision, rather than merely a political imperative
fueled by the discontent of the disempowered. Idealistic progressives,
distinctively of all progressives, focus on these experiences of ideal
forms of life, not only as a minimal constituent of a moral vision, but
as constituting the moral vision itself. For the idealistic progressive,
the content of the good, and the good life, that the state ought to use
its power to ensure and create, is quite self-consciously constructed
from these intensely subjective, although by no means individualistic,
direct, occasional, and for the most part "un-lived" experiences of the
good life.
Second, for some progressives, the meaning of the good and the
good life that the state ought to promote, should be understood by
reference to the recurrent experience of freedom, and the understanding of its necessity, even within objective conditions of constraint, subordination, deprivation, and bondage. These progressives - whom I
call "existential progressives" - identify the content of the good life
with these concrete lived experiences of freedom. The good life, for
the existential progressive, is the life that both understands and constructs itself as authentically constituted by its possibilities; appreciates the open and identified choice; and maintains a passion for free
play, ambiguity, and change. For the existentialist, the "good life" is
the life that is consciously lived in conditions of constant internal subjective growth and external flux. The core value, t~en, is authenticity,
and the core political imperative is to maximize the social conditions
79. King, I Have a Dream, in WORDS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING 95-97 (C.S. King ed.
1983).
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that make possible an authentic life. Life is that which changes, and
the good life is the self-conscious realization of that ideal. Political
and social life should be organized in such a way as to make such a life
realizable for all.
·
This existential understanding of freedom, choice, possibility, and
openness has had tremendous influence on the Critical Legal Studies
movement, and .hence indirectly on progressive constitutionalism as
well. To avoid confusion, we should identify two quite different lines
of influence. First, existential progressives, like critical scholars and
critical legal scholars, have generally embraced the descriptive critical
claim that behind the facade of control, determinacy, or rigidity in any
particular political choice - including, significantly, the judicial
choice - lies an underlying reality of choice, possibility, indeterminacy, and freedom. This idea has played a tremendously important
role in the development of the "indeterminacy critique" in the Critical
Legal Studies movement. In an early and seminal piece, Duncan Kennedy described the existential and phenomenological experience of judicial choice in this way:
[T]he ackn·owledgement of contradiction makes it easier to understand
judicial behavior that offends the ideal of the judge as a supremely rational being. The judge canno~, any more than the analyst, avoid the
moment of truth in which one simply shifts modes. In place of the appa~
ratus of rule making and rule application, with its attendant premises
and attitudes, we come suddenly on a gap, a balancing test, a good faith
standard, a fake or incoherent rule, or the enthusiastic adoption of a
train of reasoning all know will be ignored in the next case. In terms of
individualism, the judge has suddenly begun.to act in bad faith. In terms
of altruism, she has found herself. The only thing that counts is this
change in attitude, but it is hard to imagine anything more elusive of
analysis. 80
·

· Second, existential progressives, like critical scholars, have also
generally ~mbraced the related ethical claim that the de~truction of
socially constructed hierarchies and the limits on freedom they impose
would be a grun in freedom and hence· a gain in the good life for all
affected individuals. In a series of books and articles, Roberto Unger;
still the foremost spokesperson for· normative critical thought, insists
that the destruction of social hierarchy in all its forms is a sufficiently
rich normative agenda for a progressive movemeiit. 81 Any such "disentrenchment'" constitutes i:i. gain in both freedom and· ·empowerment.

..

80. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1776 (1976) (emphasis in original).
·
81. R. ·UNGER; FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL T,HEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987); Unger, supra note 4.

684

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:641

In his most recent book, False Necessity, Unger puts the point in this
way:
The guiding theme of the program of social reconstruction is the attempt to imagine institutional arrangements and social practices that can
advance the radical project beyond the point to which contemporary
forms of governmental and economic organization have carried it. By
the ... project of the modernist visionary I mean the attempt to realize
the many forms of individual or collective empowerment that result
from our relative success in disengaging our practical and passionate
dealings from the restrictive influence of entrenched social roles and hierarchies.... The program suggests how our contemporary formative
contexts might be disentrenched, . . . how they might be more fully
opened to challenge in the midst of our routine conflicts and therefore
also how they might undermine or prevent rigid forms of social division
and hierarchy.... The weakening of the influence of this prewritten
social script is to be valued not only negatively, as an occasion for a
broader range of choice, but affirmatively for the forms of empowerment
it makes possible. . . .
... [D]ifferent institutional arrangements reflect varying degrees of
advance in the denaturalization of society. Society becomes denaturalized to the extent that its formative practices and preconceptions are
open to effective challenge in the midst of ordinary social activity ....
The concept of denaturalization or emancipation from false necessity includes the idea of a weakening of rigid roles and hierarchies. It therefore
also refers to the development of forms of production, exchange, and
passionate attachment that are less marked by such rankings and divisions. . . . I use the term negative capability to suggest the variety of
forms of empowerment that denaturalization makes possible. 82

For existential progressives, then, as for critical legal scholars, the
state should act in a way that furthers a program of disentrenchment
and denaturalization. The goal is a social world in which each individual and group is as free as possible to "find herself" through discovering her multiple selves; to disentrench herself from rigid roles imposed
from without; to "shift modes"; to denaturalize her roots; and to discover her essence not in her essentiality, but in her potentiality. The
means by which this might happen is, in part, state action responsive
to social rigidity: the state should properly be viewed as one mechanism, among others, for destabilizing social entrenchment. By so doing, and only by so doing, can it further rather than frustrate the
"good life" of the citizens over whom it unquestionably holds
dominion.
Lastly, for a third group of progressives - who can be called
"anti-subordination progressives" - the meaning of the good and the
82. R.

UNGER, supra

note 81, at 9, 164.
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good life that the state ought to promote is understood by reference to
the experiential understanding of the damage done by private and social hierarchies of authority and power. Anti-subordination progressives typically concern themselves not with the nature of the "good
life" which the state has a duty to promote, but rather with the nature
of its absence which the state has a duty to prevent. The meaning of
the good, for anti-subordination progressives, is negatively inferred
from varying experiences of subordination, bondage, and invasion.
The sorts of experiences of inequality that inform anti-subordinationist
politics and legal thought are vast. They include, for example, the
daily, numbing joylessness of a materially impoverished existence; the
self-contempt from being regarded as essentially less than human, less
than whole, less than entitled, or less than respected; the pain of being
a target of hatred and abuse; the dehumanization of being an object of
property, of sexuality, or of another's goals and ambitions; the general
day-to-day horror of being systematically lessened or "handicapped"
so that another can feel whole; of being systematically dirtied or polluted so that another can feel pure and clean; of being systematically
rendered contingent, natural, bodily, of the dirt, or of the earth so that
another can feel transcendental, free, spiritual, or rational; and of being systematically perverted, bent, and marginalized so that another
can feel normal, straight, or central.
Subjective experiences of constraint, invasion, and bondage are
also vast: they include the experience of the physical bondage of
shackles, chains, whips, bits, and gags; the experience of the sexual
bondage of an unwanted partner in a false intimacy; the constraints on
life itself of the often unchosen and more often unwanted career of
motherhood; the restrictions on livelihood, social contribution, career,
and public work brought on even by wanted and celebrated mothering; and the invasiveness of mandated constructions of sexual intimacy
and sexual choice. The meaning of bondage, invasion, constraint, and
restriction, to the anti-subordination progressive, is in large part the
content of these experiences. The meaning of the good or of the "good
life," to anti-subordination progressives, is informed by the content of
those experiences, and the good life, very simply, would mean their
absence. 83 The state, then, should aim to create a world free of these
83. Storytelling, particularly the telling of stories relating experiences of subordination, plays
a major role in anti-subordination progressive legal thought as well as in progressive political
thought. See, e.g., Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989); Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987);
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320 (1989).
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experiences. The good life that the state ought to promote is the life
unconstrained by the foot on one's neck and the gag in one's throat.
B.

Progressive Jurisprudence

As is the case with conservative political theory, these three responses to social power inform three distinctive interpretations of our
major jurisprudential traditions: natural law, legal positivism, and
legal instrumentalism. First, like conservative moralists, progressive
idealists tend to be "natural lawyers": progressive idealists, like conservative moralists, view law as definitionally aspiring toward a moral
ideal. However, whereas the conservative natural lawyer gives content
to the moral ideal toward which law aspires by reference to a community's conventional morality, the progressive natural lawyer gives content to the ideal by reference to the glimpses, memories, or dreams of a
truly good life as ,experienced by the relatively disempowered: a life
lived within actual conditions of liberty, equality, or freedom. Progressive idealism and, the natural law tradition thus combine in a distinctively progressive version of natural law: the "legalism" of
"natural law" gives foundation, permanence, and a link to the past to
an otherwise unfettered idealism, while the progressive's unique blend
of idealism and experientialism frees the natural law tradition from the
shackles of social conventionality and tradition.
Thus, for the progressive natural lawyer, the ideal toward which
government should aim is informed not by history but by possibility,
not by authority but by vision, and not by the traditions that have
triumphed over unlived dreams but by the dreams that have survived
in the interstices of the triumphant traditions. Law should and does
aspire toward unlived ideals, not toward a perfect congruence with the
wisdom of historically established tradition. Martin Luther King's
Letter from the Birmingham Jail contains what is undoubtedly this
tradition's most eloquent restatement:
There are two types of law: just and unjust. ... One has not only a legal
but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral
responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine
that "an·unjust law is no law at all."
A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the
law of God., An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the
moqil law. To put it.in the terms of St. ,Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law
is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. Any
law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades human
personality is unjust. All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false sense of
inferiority. Segreg11;tion, to use the terminology of the Jewish philoso-
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pher Martin Buber, substitutes an "I-it" relationship for an "I-thou" relationship and ends up relegating persons to the status of things. Hence
segregation is not only politically, economically and sociologically unsound, it is morally wrong and sinful. . . . Is not segregation an existential expression of man's tragic separation, his awful estrangement, his
terrible sinfulness? Thus it is that I can urge men to obey the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court, for it is morally right; and I can urge them to
disobey segregation ordinances, for they are morally wrong. 84

The difference, then, for the progressive natural lawyer, between
the just and the unjust law, and the difference between the laws that do
and do not command obedience, is that the just law "uplifts human
personality" while the unjust law degrades it. The just law promotes
and encourages the good life: the life lived in conditions of true equality, liberty, and community, as those ideals are understood in our visions, our aspirations, our dreams, and occasionally, our experiences.
The unjust law, quite simply, is the law that denies or frustrates or
denigrates that law. The former commands obedience - is true law
- the latter does not.
As idealism implies a progressive version of natural law, existentialism lends itself to a progressive interpretation of legal positivism.
Existential progressives, like legal conservatives, tend to be legal positivists: they share with legal conservatives an overriding skepticism
toward the aspiration to moral knowledge inherent in both the traditionalist and idealist versions of the natural law tradition. For the existential progressive, as for the legal conservative, the "law" is not that
which aspires toward a moral ideal (whether informed by the community's tradition or the disempowered's utopian vision). Rather, law
(whatever it ought to be) is nothing more than a series of actual, concrete choices made by particular, identifiable powerful actors. Both
progressive and conservative positivists view "law" as importantly
identified not with a continuing effort to achieve congruence with a
moral ideal, but as a set of contingent choices. Law is not a set of
principles that "uplifts human personality." Law is a set of acts and
choices taken by particular people at particular moments in history.
The pivotal psychic difference between conservative and progressive positivists is political, not jurisprudential: whereas the conservative positivist sees in the set of acts and choices that constitute the
"law" opportunities for obedience to prior legal commands, the progressive positivist sees in the same set of acts and choices opportunities
for authenticity, freedom, self-actualization, and judgment. The re84. King, Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 84-86 (1963). For a
critical commentary, see Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2152 (1989).
.
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sulting jurisprudential difference between conservative positivists and
progressive positivists is that the conservative positivist identifies the
relevant history - the set of choices - that defines the content of
"law" with the past, whereas the progressive positivist identifies the
"law" with the future possibilities and the choices necessitated by virtually any and all verbal legal formulations. The progressive positivist
views law as an open set of possibilities, and thus a vehicle for change,
growth, and authenticity, rather than the static product of an unambiguous past historical process, and thus a vehicle for obedience.
Suzanna Sherry wrote:
Above all, judging is an act of controlled creativity. Like writing at
its best, it both draws on and evokes memories of what has gone before,
but by innovation rather than by mimicry. It simultaneously acknowledges our debt to the past and denies that the past should control the
present. The task of the pragmatist decisionmaker is to reconcile a
flawed tradition with an imperfect world so as to improve both and do
damage to neither. We can argue about whether a particular judge does
so well or badly, but we should recognize that neither her job nor ours
can ever be mechanical. 85
"Law," then, for the conservative positivist, mandates obedience,
while the same "law," for the progressive positivist, mandates choice.
Law creates, rather than closes, possibility and responsibility. For the
progressive positivist, the judge, like the citizen, is never bound and
can never be bound: the judge, like the citizen, actively chooses the
law she obeys; she has no choice but freedom. Understanding one's
freedom - facing the necessity of choice - is the only moral imperative. It is the path and the only path toward authenticity. It is therefore recognition of freedom or authenticity - and not, as Judge
Easterbrook insists, the acquiescence in a mandate of obedience86 that constitutes the standard by which the outsider or critic can judge
the morality of the judge. Duncan Kennedy described the phenomenology of this necessity of choice:
If you tell me that there is always a right answer to a legal problem, I
will answer with these cases in which my experience was that the law
was indeterminate, or that I gave it its determinate shape as a matter of
my free ethical or political choice. It is true that when we are unselfconsciously applying rules together, we have an unselfconscious experience
of social objectivity. We know what is going to happen next by mentally
applying the rule as others will, and then they apply the rule and it
comes out the way we thought it would. But this is not in fact objectivity, and it is always vulnerable to different kinds of disruption - intentional and accidental - that suddenly disappoint our expectations of
85. Sherry, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 4, at 1013.
86. Easterbrook, A Reply, supra note 2, at 627.

February 1990]

Constitutionalism

689

consensus and make people question their own sanity and that of others.
Thus vulnerability of the field, its plasticity, its instability, are just as
essential to it as we experience it as its sporadic quality of resistance. 87

For the progressive positivist, then, both the reality of legal decisionmaking and the ideal toward which law ought to aspire is a recognition of one's authenticity through the conscious recognition of the
necessity of freedom. The reality of the judge's decision is in a sense a
microcosm of the ideal form of social life toward which law should
aspire: it is a necessarily free choice, unconstrained by prior commands, that becomes a good choice if the judge is conscious of her
freedom, and hence achieves some degree of self-realization, when
making it.
Finally, egalitarian, anti-subordination progressives, like free-market conservatives, tend toward a pragmatic, incremental, and instrumental approach toward legal progress, and hence toward an
instrumental understanding of the meaning of law as well. Both antisubordination progressives and free-market conservatives tend to identify the content of law not with a moral ideal, nor with particular concrete actions, but rather with its overriding purpose. The pivotal
differences between progressive and conservative instrumentalists,
again, are attitudinal and ethical. Whereas the conservative instrumentalist's moral skepticism is grounded in a neo-Darwinian embrace
of competitive outcomes, and hence competitive values, the progressive instrumentalist's moral skepticism is grounded in antipathy to the
hierarchies on which "competitive" outcomes rest. The progressive
instrumentalist consequently resists precisely the hierarchies - the inequalities - that produce the competitive outcomes which the conservative embraces. The progressive instrumentalist sees law not as
purposively freeing or protecting "competitive" process or outcome, as
the conservative instrumentalist envisions, but as ideally and purposively ameliorating, addressing, and in the long run abolishing the hierarchical systems of domination and subordination masked as
competitive processes producing "competitive" outcomes. For the
progressive instrumentalist, law, in its progressive essence, resists,
tempers, reduces, ameliorates, and ultimately should abolish natural,
pre- or nonlegal social hierarchy.
Progressive jurisprudence, then, is variously committed to an idealistic vision of natural law as the embodiment of a particular conception of the good, an anarchic and existential conception of positive law
as inherently possibilistic and open-ended - as inviting choice, move87. Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 518, 562 (1986) (emphasis in original).
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ment, and necessitating freedom - or an instrumental resistance to
hierarchy and a willingness to use law as a tool to that end. The relation between the experiences of subordinated persons, progressive politics, and jurisprudence might be schematized in this way:
Source of
Authority
Experience of
Ideals
Experience of
Freedom
Experience of
Social Hierarchy

Progressive Politics
Idealistic
--7
Progressivism
Existential
---7
Progressivism
Anti-subordination ---7
Progressivism

Jurisprudence
Progressive Natural
Law
Progressive Legal
Positivism
Progressive
Instrumentalism

Based on sharply contrasting politics, the jurisprudence of progressive and conservative constitutionalists thus sharply contrast as well:
Conservative
(Reliance on
authority;
attraction to
social power)
Progressive
(Reliance on
Experience;
Antipathy to
Social Power)

Natural Law

Legal Positivism

Instrumentalism

Moralism/
Traditionalism

"Imperativist"
Positivism

Pro-Competitive
Instrumentalism

Idealism

"Possibilistic"
Positivism

AntiSubordinationist
Instrumentalism

C. Progressive Constitutionalism

Progressive constitutional theory begins with a critique of conservative constitutionalism, which parallels the critique of conservative political theory at the center of progressive politics. In every case
in which the Court acts to restrain the normative power of "the state"
and to entrench or encourage the community's normative authority, it
is also, of necessity, strengthening the social or private power of
whatever social institution or private group undergirds that authority.
Thus, in all of the due process cases discussed above, the Court did
indeed restrain, in some way, the power of "the state" to act on "its
own" normative vision: in Bowers v. Hardwick, 88 Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 89 and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 90 it restrained the
power of the judiciary to legislate on the basis of "its own" conception
of the good; in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
88. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see also supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
89. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989); see also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
90. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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Services, 91 the power of the executive policing branch to interfere with
family life; and in Penry v. Lynaugh 92 and Stanford v. Kentucky, 9 3 the
power of judges to dictate the terms of the community's conscience. It

is also true, however, that in each of these cases, the Court expanded,
legitimated, and further entrenched the clusters of social power that
undergird the various sources of communal normative authority to
which the Court insisted the political state must defer. Thus,
DeShaney limited the power of policing agencies over families, but at
the same time legitimated and further entrenched the familial power of
parents, step-parents, and foster parents to abuse children physically94
- a power that undoubtedly underscores both the father's normative
authority within the family, and the family's normative authority in
society. Bowers limited judicial power, but left 'intact the power of the
heterosexual majority over the subordinated homosexual minority,95
just as Webster left intact the power of some men over many women's
reproductive and sexual lives. 96 In each case, the "passive" judicial
response limited "state power," and hence "state hierarchy," but it
exacerbated social hierarchy and the injustices to which those hierarchies give rise.
Conservative understandings of equality and of the equal protection clause are subject to a similar criticism. The Court's opinion in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 97 undoubtedly restricted "state
power": the Court restricted the power of the Richmond City Council
to interfere in the competitive process of the construction industry,
and by so doing enhanced the individual's entitlement to compete in
that market free of the influence of racial factors. What the opinion
also does, however, is reinforce the social power of ec;:onoinically privileged whites to set the terms of inclusion for economically disenfranchised blacks, just as the Court's opinion in Washington v. Davis 98
helped to entrench the racial identity of the Washington, D.C., police
force by affirming the testing standards employed by the white-dominated department. Both opinions thus read the equal protection
clause in a way that simultaneously restricts the power of states and
enhances the economic and social power of whites.
91. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989); see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
92. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); see also supra note 53 and acc~mpanying text.
93. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989); see also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
94. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989) (refusing to find liability for county's failure to intervene
to protect child from abusive parent).
95. See 478 U.S. at 191-96.
96. 109 S. Ct. 3058 (1989).
97. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
98. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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Lastly, conservative understandings of the nature of constitutional
interpretation, while concededly restrictive of the power of judicial
state actors to impose their "own" values or conceptions of the good,
expand considerably the power of the dominant forces and victors of
this country's militaristic and legalistic past. Progressive scholar
Suzanna Sherry makes the point this way:
This search for interpretive devices that eliminate judicial discretion is,
at bottom, profoundly positivist and profoundly relativist. It treats the
written Constitution as an absolute sovereign by excluding any examination of the moral dimensions of its language. Such a view is positivist in
the sense that "it makes no difference . . . if the sovereign command is
nothing but arbitrary will: order still requires capitulating to it." It is
relativist in that it denies the availability of any higher truth than what a
particular society has already chosen to embody in its written fundamental law.
. . . The desire to appeal to the absolute authority of the historical
Constitution is also self-replicating. To the extent that we as a society
relieve ourselves of the obligation to make difficult moral decisions, we
further undermine our capacity to do so. Moral sensibilities, whether of
an individual or of a community, are best developed by making moral
choices .
. . . To tell judges that they must engage in "value-free" judging - to
confine them to the unsupplemented text - diminishes the very definition of moral choice by curtailing the sources of moral authority. Moreover, once we recognize that the legislature should not always prevail,
we must delegate final moral authority somewhere: should we entrust it
to judges who can reason about both morality and consent, or to an
ancient document simply because it reflects our erstwhile will? Federal
judges, however unrepresentative, are a part of the community in a way
in which dead founders and parchment under glass cannot be. 99

Progressive constitutional theory, however, does not stop with critique. Like conservative constitutional commitments, the affirmative
progressive constitutional commitments I examine here - notably a
substantive understanding of the equality guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment, a positive account of the liberty protected by the due process clause, and what I call a possibilistic understanding of the nature
of constitutional interpretation - are ultimately rooted in political
and ethical attitudes toward power and authority. Each of these three
commitments is supported by most of the major progressive constitutional theorists. As was also the case with the conservative paradigm,
however, different progressives support each element of the progressive paradigm for often contrasting and conflicting reasons. Those internal conflicts in tum reveal the diversity and breadth of
99. Sherry, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 4, at 1010-11 (citations omitted).
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contemporary progressive constitutional thought, as well as its political and jurisprudential roots.
1. Equal Protection Jurisprudence
Let me begin with the progressive understanding of the meaning of
equality, and hence of the import of the equal protection clause. Very
generally, "equality," for the progressive constitutionalist, means substantive equality and the "equal protection clause" constitutes a commitment to rid the culture of the stultifying, oppressive, and damaging
consequences of the hierarchic domination of some social groups by
others. In their view, the clause is aimed not at protecting competitive
rationality against the pernicious effects of race or sex-conscious irrational legislative categorization, but rather, at correcting maldistributions of social power, wealth, and prestige. The targeted evil is not
irrational state action, but state action or inaction, rational or not, and
intentional or not, that perpetuates the damaging social, economic, domestic, or private domination of some groups by others. So understood, the clause is a tool for dismantling society's racist, misogynist,
· homophobic, patriarchic, and economic hierarchies. The goal of the
equal protection clause is not rational competition, but substantive social equality.
Thus, according to various progressive arguments, the equal protection clause not only permits, but positively requires that the community take affirmative steps to achieve substantive racial justice; 100
that a state or municipality enact ordinances to rid itself of a subordinating pornographic subculture; 101 that the state protect women's reproductive choices so as to rid itself of the patriarchal expropriation of
women's reproductive labor; 102 that its law enforcement resources be
committed to ridding women's lives of private violence, both sexual
and otherwise; 103 that the state take positive steps to eliminate hetero100. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, supra note 4.
101. c. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 4, ch. 13.
102. See Brief for the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); R. GOLDSTEIN, MOTHER LoVE AND ABORTION (1988); C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED,
supra note 4, at ch. 8; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 1353-56;
L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 4, at 243-45; Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Karst, The

Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
91 HARV. L. REV. I, 53-59 (1977); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 955 (1984).
103. West, Marital Rape Exemptions and Equal Protection, 42 U. FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming
1990); Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1986).
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sexual privilege; 104 and that the community in some way commit its
economic resources to eliminating the subordinating effects of severe
material impoverishment. 105 "Equal protection," for the progressive,
means the eradication of social, economic, and private, as well as legal,
hierarchies that damage. The _contra.st with conservative understanding of that phrase is nothing less than stunning: for the conservative,
the clause invalidates a wide range of state-sponsored "affirmative actions" on behalf of the disempowered; for the progressive, it not only
permits such actions but may well require them.
This interpretation of the equal protection clause as requiring substantive rather than formal equality, and as targeting maldistributions
of social power, rather than irrational legislative classifications, is
supported by all three progressive political and jurisprudential
movements, but it finds its clearest support from progressive instrumentalists. For progressive instrumentalists, as for all instrumentalists, the meaning of a law is its purpose, and for progressive
instrumentalists distinctively, the purpose of the equal protection
clause is anti-subordination: the eradication of hierarchies. Anti-subordination feminist Catharine MacKinnon expressed this point in the
context of women's subordination, but her logic can readily be generalized to all subordinate groups:
There is an alternative approach, one that threads its way through
existing law and expresses, I think, the reason equality law exists in the
first place.... In this approach, an equality question is a question of the
distribution of power. Gender is also a question of power, specifically of
male supremacy and female subordination. The question of equality,
from the standpoint of what it is going to take to get it, is at root a
question of hierarchy, which - as power succeeds in constructing social
perception and social reality - derivatively becomes a categorical distinction, a difference. Here, on the first day that matters, dominance was
achieved, probably by force. By the second day, division along the same
lines had to be relatively firmly in place. On the third day, if not sooner,
differences were demarcated, together with social systems to exaggerate
them in perception and in fact, because the systematically differential
delivery of benefits and deprivations required making no mistake about
who was who ....
I call this the dominance approach, and it is the ground I have been
standing on in criticizing mainstream law. The goal of this dissident
approach is not to make legal categories trace and trap the way things
are. It is not to make rules that fit reality. It is critical of reality. Its
task is not to formulate abstract standards that will produce determinate
104. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187; Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process
and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988).
105. Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 4.
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outcomes in particular cases. Its project is more substantive, more jurisprudential than formulaic, which is why it is difficult for the mainstream
discourse to dignify it as an approach to doctrine or to imagine it as a
rule of law at alJ.106
As mentioned above, an anti-subordinationist reading of the equal
protection clause lends not only constitutional support, but a constitutional mandate, to state-sponsored affirmative action plans. If, as
MacKinnon suggests, the reason we have equality law in the first place
is to eradicate the subordination of some groups by others, then states
are not only permitted, but obligated to take affirmative steps to
achieve social equality. Thus, progressive constitutional theorist
David Strauss reasons that the equal protection clause and that
clause's most important interpretive gloss, Brown v. Board of Education, 101 are best read not to require color-blind legislation, as numerous conservative theorists and jurists now assume, but rather, to
require legislation that will achieve a racially equal society:
The prohibition against discrimination established by Brown is not
rooted in colorblindness at all. Instead, it is, like affirmative action,
deeply race-conscious; like affirmative action, the prohibition against discrimination reflects a deliberate decision to treat blacks differently from
other groups, even at the expense of innocent whites. It follows that
affirmative action is not at odds with the principle of nondiscrimination
established by Brown but is instead logically continuous with that principle. It also follows that the interesting question is not whether the Constitution permits affirmative action but why the Constitution does not
require affirmative action.
. . . The prohibition against racial discrimination prohibits - and
must necessarily prohibit - the use of accurate racial generalizations
that disadvantage blacks. But to prohibit accurate racial generalizations
is to engage in something very much like affirmative action. Specifically,
a principle prohibiting accurate racial generalizations has many of the
same characteristics as affirmative action; and the various possible explanations of why accurate racial generalizations are unconstitutional lead
to the conclusion that failure to engage in affirmative action may also
sometimes be unconstitutional. 108
This substantive interpretation of equality as the true meaning of
equal protection is also supported by progressivism's existential
strand. For the progressive existentialist, the most significant barrier
to enjoyment of a free, authentic, and hence good life is the existence
of rigid social, private, and domestic hierarchies, and for the progressive positivist, law is both a sphere of free choice, and a means by
which social life can be made more free. The equal protection clause,
106. c. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 4, at 40.
107. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
108. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, supra note 4, at 100.
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then, properly read, should serve as a mechanism by which social hierarchies are constantly challenged and undermined, and the power they
embody redistributed. Race-conscious affirmative action plans, then,
become the prototype for legislation mandated or suggested by the
equal protection clause: when undertaking affirmative action, a state
uses its power under the guidance of the equal protection clause to
challenge and undermine social and private racial hierarchy.
More generally, the ideal and true content of the equal protection
clause, for the existential progressive, is simply its negative potential
for upsetting the settled distributions of power and wealth that constrain as they define private life. Unger's reinterpretation of the equal
protection clause as ideally encoding a set of "destabilization rights,"
set forth in his classic essay The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 109
contains the clearest restatement of this existential ideal:
The central ideal of the system of destabilization rights is to provide a
claim upon governmental power obliging government to disrupt those
forms of division and hierarchy that, contrary to the spirit of the constitution, manage to achieve stability only by distancing themselves from
the transformative conflicts that might disturb them. . . . Rather than
just correct specific collective disadvantages within the circumscribed
area of state action, it would also seek to break up entire areas of institutional life and social practice that run contrary to the scheme of the newmodeled constitution. . . .
Sometimes a destabilization right might work through a direct invalidation of established law.... The destabilization right might also operate in another, far less extreme way. It would act not to invalidate laws
directly but to disrupt power orders in particular institutions or localized
areas of social practice. The power orders to be disrupted would be
those that, in violation of the principles governing social and economic
organization had become effectively insulated from the disturbances of
democratic conflict. As a result, they would threaten to eviscerate the
force of democratic processes in just the way that citadels of private
power do in the existing democracies.... The guiding criteria for the
development of this branch of the law would be found in the principles
that inform social and economic organization in the empowered
democracy. 110

Finally, progressive idealists and natural lawyers also understand
the equal protection clause substantively rather than formally. For
the progressive idealist, it is some measure of substantive equality and
some measure of freedom from the economic, material, social, and
spiritual burdens of inequality, rather than freedom from state-sponsored "irrationality" that is the pre-condition of a good life. For the
109. Unger, supra note 4.
110. Id. at 612-13.
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progressive idealist, the law should embody these ideals, and therefore,
for the progressive natural lawyer no less than the progressive positivist and instrumentalist, substantive equality - the eradication of damaging hierarchy - is that to which the fourteenth amendment directs
the legislative energies of the state.
The content of that guarantee, however, is somewhat different for
the progressive natural lawyer than for the progressive existentialist or
anti-subordinationist. As noted above, the "ideal" for the progressive
idealist is the good life - in King's words the "uplifted personality"
- rather than either pure freedom, as for the existentialist, or pure
equality, as for the anti-subordinationist. Therefore, for the progressive natural lawyer, the equal protection clause ensures "substantive
equality" because by doing so it insures those minimal conditions necessary for an ideally flourishing life; the clause is less concerned by this
view, with establishing either the conditions for truly free choice or the
conditions for absolute social as well as political equality. Abuses of
social power and the racial, sexual, and class hierarchies that sustain
those abuses, make the "ideal life" inaccessible to the socially
subordinated. Racism occasions an invasion of body, mind, and soul
that Patricia Williams has tellingly called "spirit murder"; 111 misogyny engenders a self-hatred and self-denial that precludes often life
itself, and certainly the good life; and poverty leaves no time, much
less energy, resources, or will, for activities that enrich the individual
and integrate her in the community. Idealists and progressive natural
lawyers are consequently more likely to target the eradication of poverty, racism, and misogyny, rather than more abstract notions of
"equality" or "freedom," as the true goal of the equal PlOtection guarantee; it is the damage wrought by those substantive conditions, after
all, that frustrates and precludes a flourishing life.
Unsurprisingly, it has been idealist progressive scholars grounded
in a natural law tradition, rather than either existentialist scholars
rooted in critical positivism or anti-subordinationists rooted in pragmatism, who have argued most strenuously that the fourteenth
amendment requires that the state protect against the most egregious
risks of massive economic inequality - or, stated affirmatively, that
the state has a constitutional duty to guarantee welfare rights. Thus, it
was the constitutional theorist Frank Michelman, in the sixties and
seventies, who did more than. any other to popularize the idealistic
argument that "equal protection" requires the states to guarantee a
111. Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Finger-Pointing as the
Response to Racism, 42 MIAMI L. REv. 127 (1987).
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minimal level of welfare. 112 Without food, shelter, and clothing, other
constitutional entitlements are virtually meaningless; but more significantly, for the idealist, without food, shelter, and clothing, life itself is
a burden and a misery. In keeping both with idealist progressive politics and with naturalist jurisprudence, Michelman argued that not
only should the Constitution protect minimal welfare rights, but that
properly read it in fact already does:
Without basic education - without the literacy, fluency and elementary
understanding of politics and markets that are hard to obtain without it
- what hope is there of effective participation in the last-resort political
system? On just this basis, it seems, the Supreme Court itself has expressly allowed that "some identifiable quantum of education" may be a
constitutional right. But if so, then, what about life itself, health and
vigor, presentable attire, or shelter not only from the elements but from
the physical and psychological onslaughts of social debilitation? Are not
these interests the universal, rock-bottom prerequisites of effective participation in democratic representation . . . ? How can there be . . .
sophisticated rights to a formally unbiased majoritarian system, but no
rights to the indispensable means of effective participation in that system? How can the Supreme Court admit the possibility of a right to
minimum education, but go out of its way to deny flatly any right to
subsistence, shelter, or health care?ll3

In contrast to MacK.innon's anti-subordinationist argument for
substantive equality given above, 114 Michelman's idealistic arguments
for welfare rights are premised on the assumption that it is the good
life, not the equal life, that is the "point" of equality ·law. Thus,
Michelman tended to emphasize the difference, rather than commonality, between absolute egalitarian conceptions of equal protection,
and idealist conceptions. In his seminal defense of welfare rights, he
was clearly more concerned with distinguishing his idealistic argument
for the protection of welfare rights through equality law from egalitarian and anti-subordinationist interpretations of equal protection, than
with distinguishing his conception from formal anti-discrimination
models of the clause:
[T]he judicial "equality" explosion of recent times has largely been ignited by reawakened sensitivity, not to equality, but to a quite different
sort of value or claim which might better be called "minimum welfare."
In the recent judicial handiwork which has been hailed (and reviled) as
an "egalitarian revolution," a particularly striking and propitious note
has been sounded through those acts whereby the Court has directly
shielded poor persons from the most elemental consequence of poverty

112. See, e.g., Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 4.
113. Id. at 677 (citations omitted).
114. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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Of course, the Court's "egalitarian" interventions are often occasioned by problems which would not exist but for economic inequality.
Yet I hope to make clear that in many instances their purposes could be
more soundly and satisfyingly understood as vindication of a state's duty
to protect against certain hazards which are endemic in an unequal society, rather than vindication of a duty to avoid complicity in unequal
treatment. 115

For all three branches of progressive thought, although for different reasons, the equal protection clause is concerned not with pernicious state action, or irrational classifications, or even badly motivated
governance, but rather, with the profound damage brought about
through gross disparities of social power. Although their reasons differ, and differ profoundly, progressives believe the state is affirmatively
obligated under the Constitution to use its legal power to protect its
citizens, and protect them equally, from the damage wrought by abusive social power and the damaging hierarchies of race, gender, and
class to which that power gives rise. The goal of equal protection for
the progressive quite clearly has nothing to do with color-blindness,
sex-blindness, or class-blindness, unless those strategl.es are conducive
to some other end. The goal, rather, is a social life freed of the crushing consequences of inequality; the goal is an equal society.
2. Liberty and Due Process Jurisprudence

For the progressive constitutionalist, the "liberty" to which we are
entitled under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause is "affirmative" just as the "equality" to which we are entitled under equal
protection is "substantive": "Liberty" means the affirmative liberty to
live a meaningfully free and autonomous life, rather than, as for the
conservative, the liberty to live the good life as defined by community
standards and as restricted through processes defined by law. The due
process clause, for progressives, guarantees the freedom to make
choices that will truly enrich our lives, rather than the freedom to
make those choices sanctioned by a community's authoritative traditions through processes established by its positive law'.· Thus, for some
progressives, the clause minimally guarantees the freedom to choose
when and with whom to have and raise children. For others, it guarantees the freedom to decide when, if, and with whom to be sexually
intimate. For others, it guarantees the material support necessary to a
productive and unalienated work life, to a healthy private home and
community life, and to meaningful participation in the public sphere
115. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 9 (1969) (emphasis added; citations
omitted).
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of democratic decisionmaking. The common thread in these progressive positions is clear: the due process clause, for progressives, commits the state to ensure the conditions necessary to the enjoyment of
affirmative liberty.
The contrast with the conservative's understanding of the guarantee of liberty is again dramatic. For the progressive, the affirmative
liberty the due process clause guarantees not only invalidates the antisodomy statute upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick, 116 but may well affirmatively require that the state take some action to eradicate the harmful
effects of the homophobia to which not only state action, but religious
dogma and communitarian "traditions," have given rise.
Similarly, for the progressive, the affirmative liberty the due process clause guarantees not only invalidates anti-abortion statutes of the
sort upheld in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 117 but may require the state to take action to ensure the availability of the means of
reproductive freedom to all women, regardless of their economic class.
Put generally, for the progressive, the clause should be used to challenge the social power that gives rise to the very normative authority
that the conservative argues constitutes the source of wisdom which
law should incorporate and which the due process clause must accordingly protect.
Roe v. Wade 118 is as central to the progressive paradigm of privacy, liberty, and due process as Bowers is to the conservative. 119 In
sharp contrast not only to conservative constitutionalists, but also to a
number of liberal legalists, progressive constitutionalists tend to support Roe and the positive understanding ofliberty on which it is based.
Again, though, their reasons for doing so diverge.
First, the affirmation of the "positive liberty" to choose the meaning and content of one's reproductive life at the heart of Roe's reasoning is at least exemplary, if not emblematic, of the meaning of
"authenticity" that the existentialist equates with the good life. For
the existentialist, the right to abortion "denaturalizes" (to use Unger's
word) and consequently humanizes the pregnant woman, ensuring the
choice essential for authentic selfhood and humanness, and facilitating
enjoyment of a genuinely free life. The "pro-choice" label for reproductive rights activists thus resonates with existential progressive
thought: for the existentialist, the choice itself is what is of value, the
choice itself is what is advocated. The freedom to decide one's life's
116.
117.
118.
119.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
109 s. Ct. 3040 (1989).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
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course, rather than to have it thrust upon her, is what gives a life
moral meaning. This choice, then, for the existential progressive, as a
constitutional matter, cannot be legally interfered with - any interference by the state constitutes a "due process" violation. The due
process clause guarantees not just freedom from undue and illegal interference with one's private life, but the affirmative liberty to pursue
those choices most fundamental to the fruits of affirmative liberty.
The decision to carry a pregnancy to term is clearly such a choice.
Although most of Suzanna Sherry's work is idealist rather than existentialist, her defense of reproductive freedom sounds these existential
themes:
Anti-abortion laws deprive women of the opportunity to choose freely
among these discretionary moral choices, and hence of the opportunity
to exercise and improve their capacity for moral knowledge and moral
choice. Such laws coerce women's moral decisions, stifling their ability
for growth through self-criticism. Anti-abortion laws thus interfere with
... the basic aspects of human morality and human flourishing. Furthermore, to the extent that a moral choice is coerced, the actor is less
likely to accept responsibility for that choice. The coercion of anti-abortion laws discourages women from developing the moral sensibilities that
come from making moral choices and accepting responsibility for them.
It keeps them, in short, from becoming virtuous. 120

Progressive positivists support the outcome in Roe not only for
moral reasons, but for a purely jurisprudential reason as well, a reason
that is also rooted in existential premises. The existentially inspired
progressive positivist, of all constitutional theorists, will be the least
bothered by the apparent "activism" exhibited by the Court's willingness to "discover" a fundamental right to reproductive freedom in the
unwritten part of the Constitution. For the existential positivist this
activism is a necessary, inevitable aspect of judicial decisionmaking, as
it is of all decisionmaking; it is certainly not peculiar to Roe. What is
peculiar to Roe is the Court's willingness to acknowledge the necessity
of choice with which it is inevitably faced when making constitutional
decisions. Far from condemning the decision for that acknowledgement, however, the existential positivist is likely to commend it. The
Court must inevitably "act" when making decisions, and what that
inevitability entails is both choice and responsibility. The acknowledgement of that existential reality in Roe, then, is constitutional decisionmaking at its best.
The progressive idealist and the progressive natural lawyer will
also support Roe and the affirmative conception of liberty on which it
is based, although for a different reason. For the idealist, "affirmative
120. Sherry, supra note 12, at 1597 (citation omitted).
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liberty" - "freedom to" rather than "freedom from" - requires,
above all else, self-possession, and self-possession in turn requires that
the individual have the authority to make decisions regarding family,
reproduction, and sexual intimacy free from interference from the
community's normative commitments. This degree of authority and
control over family, reproduction, and intimacy is, for the idealist, essential to any meaningful ideal of self-possession, self-will, and positive
liberty that the constitutional guarantee of due process could conceivably be meant to protect.
This idealistic reasoning - that the ideal life must contain the
power to make these decisions independent of the community's moral
beliefs - is at least arguably the connecting strand of the pre-Bowers
privacy cases. Although the Court undoubtedly depended upon traditionalist and conservative arguments as well, the unifying principle of
pre-Bowers privacy law was drawn from the idealist premise that
limits on the community's normative authority should be drawn from
idealistic conceptions of what a qualitatively good individual life requires, and from the progressive natural lawyer's assumption that "the
law" - in this case, constitutional law - ideally and correctly read,
incorporates those ideals. Thus, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 121 one of the
Court's earliest privacy cases, the Court merged conservative-traditionalist with progressive-idealist arguments to strike down a state
mandatory education law:
[T]he liberty ... guaranteed ... [by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.122
Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman 123 and later in Griswold v. Connecticut 124 similarly relied on both conservative and progressive
arguments:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot
be determined by reference to any code.... The balance [it strikes between individual liberty and the demands of organized society] ... is the
balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are
121.
122.
123.
124.

262
262
367
381

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

390 (1923).
at 399.
497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
479, 499-502 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).

February 1990)

Constitutionalism

703

the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from
which it broke. That tradition is a living thing....
. . . The State ... asserts that it is acting to protect the moral welfare
of its citizenry . . . .
... [Society] has traditionally concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people ....
But, as might be expected, we are not presented simply with this
moral judgment to be passed on as an abstract proposition. The secular
state ... must operate in the realm of behavior, ... and where it does so
operate, ... the choice of means becomes relevant ....
Precisely what is involved here is this: the State is asserting the right
to enforce its moral judgment by intruding upon the most intimate details of the marital relation with the full power of the criminal law....
[T]he Statute allows the State to enquire into, prove and punish married
people for the private use of their marital intimacy. 125

And finally, in Roe v. Wade, 126 the Court made explicit that the
liberty being protected was the liberty to live a good life, as defined by
ideals of autonomy and freedom from want and unreasonable
restraint:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty ... as we feel it is, or ... in the Ninth
Amendment[], ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State
would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even
in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring,
may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological
harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by
child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with
the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In
other cases, ... the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. 127

The anti-subordinationist's support for a positive understanding of
the meaning of liberty is considerably more tentative than that displayed by the Justices of the Warren and Burger Courts. Indeed, of all
progressives, only anti-subordinationists tend to be critical of both the
idealism-based argument and the "authenticity" claims that resonate
in the Court's reasoning. For the anti-subordinationist, and hence for
125. 367 U.S. at 542-48 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring).
126. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
127. 410 U.S. at 153.
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the progressive instrumentalist, neither the authentic, self-conscious
choice which concerns the existentialist, nor the privacy necessary to
the ideal life for the idealist-progressive, are truly possible within conditions of societal subordination. Consequently, neither authenticity
nor privacy justify an affirmative understanding of the liberty to which
individuals are entitled. Providing individuals with the freedom to
make personal or private decisions in the face of the influence of the
community's normative authority, within general conditions of inequality, may do nothing to further the empowerment of the
subordinate, and hence nothing to further their true well-being. Indeed, freeing the individual from the constraints of the community's
normative authority may prove harmful: it may simply render her
more vulnerable to the degrading and subordinating pressures of a
now insulated private sphere of personal and familial political hierarchy. Thus, anti-subordination progressives have little to say about
"positive liberty" in general, and generally do not support the outcome in Roe on that basis. Catharine MacKinnon's arguments against
the reasoning in Roe (not the outcome) are representative:
Arguments for abortions under the rubric of feminism have rested
upon the right to control one's own body - gender neutral. I think that
argument has been appealing for the same reasons it is inadequate: socially, women's bodies have not been ours; we have not controlled their
meanings and destinies. . . .
In private, consent tends to be presumed. It is true that a showing of
coercion voids this presumption. But the problem is getting anything
private to be perceived as coercive. Why one would allow force in private - the "why doesn't she leave" question asked of battered women
- is a question given its urgency by the social meaning of the private as
a sphere of choice. But for women the measure of the intimacy has been
the measure of the oppression. This is why feminism has had to explode
the private. This is why feminism has seen the personal as the political.
The private is the public for those for whom the personal is the political.
In this sense, there is no private, either normatively or empirically. Feminism confronts the fact that women have no privacy to lose or to guarantee. We are not inviolable. Our sexuality is not only violable, it is hence, we are - seen in and as our violation. To confront the fact that
we have no privacy is to confront the intimate degradation of women as
the public order. 128

The anti-subordinationist argument for the result in Roe, and for
positive liberty in general, is very different from the idealistic reasoning that has tended to dominate the Court's privacy jurisprudence.
Anti-subordination progressive constitutionalists generally urge that
the result in Roe should be grounded in equality, rather than liberty,
128.

c. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 4, at 98.

February 1990]

Constitutionalism

705

and accordingly, that it should be doctrinally based on the equal protection clause, rather than the due process clause or any other penumbra! constitutional right. 129 For the anti-subordinationist, the right to
secure an abortion should be constitutionally protected, not because
such a right is essential to an ideally conceived individual life, but because it is essential to the struggle of a subordinated group - women
- against the disproportionate power of a dominant group - men.
Whether accomplished through constitutional, adjudicative, or legislative means, securing for women control over the abortion decision is
one instrumental means, among others, by which the political imbalance occasioned by male control over female sexuality and reproduction may be righted. Thus, anti-subordination constitutionalists tend
to argue that the goal of equality and the constitutional right to equal
protection - not liberty, privacy, or due process - should be the
foundation of the Court's abortion jurisprudence.
It is worth noting that the liberal Justices who continue to support
Roe are increasingly shifting their argument away from due process
and privacy arguments, toward explicitly anti-subordinationist equality-based arguments. Thus, in his dissenting opinion in Webster, in
which the Court upheld substantial regulatory restrictions on access to
abortion facilities and services, Justice Blackmun opined: "I fear for
the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of the millions of women
who have lived and come of age in the 16 years since Roe was decided.
I fear for the integrity of, and public esteem for, this Court." 130
He later elaborated:
Thus, "not with a bang, but a whimper," the plurality discards a
landmark case of the last generation, and casts into darkness the hopes
and visions of every woman in this country who had come to believe that
the Constitution guaranteed her the right to exercise some control over
her unique ability to bear children. The plurality does so either oblivious
or insensitive to the fact that millions of women, and their families, have
ordered their lives around the right to reproductive choice, and that this
right has become vital to the full participation of women in the economic
and political walks of American life. The plurality would clear the way
once again for government to force upon women the physical labor and
specific and direct medical and psychological harms that may accompany carrying a fetus to term. The plurality would clear the way again
for the State to conscript a woman's body and to force upon her a "distressful life and future."131
129. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 12; see also supra note 102.
130. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs. 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3067 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
131. 109 S. Ct. at 3077 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Progressive dissent from the Bowers 132 decision reflects the same
set of concerns. For existentialist and progressive positivists, the community's authoritative control over the morality and legality of sexuality that the opinion legitimates cuts off one avenue by which the
individual actualizes his or her potential for self-realization, and hence
authenticity, just as does the community's authoritative control over
the morality of reproduction, legitimated by the anti-Roe regression.
Sexual activity is one sphere within which the individual creates himself or herself through making choices, living with decisions, and taking responsibility for the consequences. The normative authority of
the community is nothing but an obstacle to that freedom. The "liberty" prong of the due process clause minimally protects those areas of
decisionmaking most vital to the formation of selthood, and sexuality
is one such sphere.133
Idealist objection to Bowers rests on slightly different arguments.
For the idealist, individual freedom with respect to sexual choice is
necessary not so much because of the centrality of choice to selthood,
as because of the nature of sexuality. An ideally lived life, if it includes
sexuality (which it need not), must embrace a sexuality grounded in
the individual's desire for intimacy, sharing, and openness, not in
training instilled by the community's normative authority, the force of
its positive law, or the violence of its informal mechanisms of sexual
regulation. It is for this reason that the affirmative liberty protected by
the liberty clause of the fourteenth amendment must include the liberty to dedde and act upon one's sexual orientation.
The conclusion that sexuality is "private," and therefore outside
the reach of state or community control, rests, for the idealist, on a
conception of the good life and a view of the nature of sexuality: for
sexuality to be a part of a good life it must be chosen for reasons other
than community coercion. Intimacy and sharing may be part of an
ideally constructed life, but self-alienation and lack of self-possession
clearly are not. Whether participation in sexuality is the former or the
latter depends largely upon whether or not the form of sexuality in
which participation is sought is prescribed or chosen. The due process
clause, by this view, protects against intrusion by the community's
dominant moral or social authority, manifested in the state's criminal
law, into the individual's choice of sexual orientation, for the imminently contingent reason that such intrusion renders impossible the
132. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
133. Law, supra note 104, at 222-28.
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form of life the due process clause is aimed to protect or foster. 134
The anti-subordinationist's dissatisfaction with the outcome in
Bowers is different still. For the anti-subordinationist, the Court had
an opportunity and an obligation in Bowers to attack an illegitimate
social hierarchy - the domination of the homosexual minority community by the heterosexual majority - arid refused to act on it. The
evil of state intrusion into sexual decisions is not so much that such
intrusion interferes with decisions essential to the living of the good
life, as that such state action underscores and encourages the suppression of an already subordinate group. As in the reproductive context,
then, the anti-subordinationists' argument against the outcome in
Bowers rests more on equality principles than on liberty principles, and
doctrinally more on the equal protection clause than on the due process clause. The target of constitutional intervention in the context of
sexual orientation, according to the anti-subordination constitutionalist, should not be sexual privacy and liberty, but sexual hierarchy and
heterosexual privilege. Where state law furthers, underscores, or encourages that illegitimate hierarchical ordering, the Court is constitutionally obligated to strike it down.13s
Again, then, although their reasons differ, the due process clause,
for progressives, is targeted at constraints on individual liberty imposed by illegitimate social power and ordering, rather than, as for
conservatives, at constraints imposed by illegal state power on individual liberty as defined and legitimated by social authority. Correlatively, the goal of the clause for progressives is a positively free life one in which choice is genuine and conducive to growth - rather than
a legitimating mark of underlying coercion. The state, through the
due process clause, is required to take action to facilitate, protect, and
ensure those choices most essential to that freedom. The ideal of due
process, then, is an individual life free of illegitimate social coercion
facilitated by hierarchies of class, gender, or race. The goal is an affirmatively autonomous existence: a meaningfully flourishing, independent, enriched individual life.
3.

Constitutional Interpretation

Finally, for most progressives, the Constitution is an essentially
open text inviting interpretation, rather than mandating obedience to
original intent or legislative will. All three strands of progressive
134. See Brief for Respondent, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Henderson, supra
note 83, at 1638-49; Law, supra note 104, at 224, 234-35; Law, supra note 102, at 955.
135. See Sunstein, supra note 104, at 1163-64, 1170-78; Henderson, supra note 83, at 164549; see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216, 218-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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thought support this interpretive claim. The reasons are familiar and
can be summarized quickly.
First, for progressive positivists, the Constitution is possibilistic
rather than closed for the straightforward reason that the "law" to
which the courts pledge allegiance when deciding cases is definitionally open-ended. Courts can, and therefore should, use their adjudicative power whenever possible to further progressive ends (and it is
almost always possible to do so). Law is a set of possibilities, some of
which are progressive. Law, including constitutional law, and emphatically including fourteenth amendment guarantees, is and should
be a vehicle for progressive social change.
Possibilistic constitutional interpretation - built on the belief that
the Constitution is always open to a range of interpretive meanings,
some of which are progressive - is also supported by progressive natural lawyers. For progressive natural lawyers, the ,Constitution is
open and possibilistic because it is the embodiment of an unlived, cultural ideal: the Constitution is itself the repository of the "glimpses,"
"memories," and "dreams" of the culture's moral ambitions. For the
progressive natural lawyer, the Constitution is indeed "possibilistic,"
but not for the anarchic (or existential) reason that language inevitably
invites and demands choice, but rather, for the moral reason that the
Constitution on its own terms permits choice. The Constitution by its
nature opens the door for morally demanding adjudication: it pushes
society toward an as yet unlived ideal. The Constitution is itself The
Dream. The Constitution is "possibilistic" for the idealist, rather than
rigidly historic, simply because we have the good fortune to live in a
culture that takes its idealism seriously.
In a passage that well expresses the view of constitutional interpretation shared by scores of progressive natural lawyers, Laurence Tribe
describes the idealist Constitution and its relation to fallible adjudicative institutions:
I do not regard the rulings of the Supreme Court as synonymous with
constitutional truth.... [T]he Courts that held slaves to be non-persons,
separate to be equal, and pregnancy to be non sex-related can hardly be
deemed either final or infallible. Such passing finality as judicial pronouncements possess is an essential compromise between constitutional
order and chaos: the Constitution is an intentionally incomplete, often
deliberately indeterminate structure for the participatory evolution of
political ideals and governmental practices. This process cannot be the
special province of any single entity....
While conceding the courts a less exclusive role as constitutional oracles, this book cedes them a greater authority - and duty - to advance
that justice overtly. Judicial neutrality inescapably involves taking sides.
The judgment of the Court, though it may be to elude an issue, in effect
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settles the substance of the case. Judicial authority to determine when to
defer to others in constitutional matters is a procedural form of substantive power; judicial restraint is but another form of judicial activism....
The inescapable boundaries of societal context and consciousness argue
not that judges should restrain themselves still further, but that they
must raise distinctive voices of principle.... [T]he highest mission of the
Supreme Court, in my view, is not to conserve judicial credibility, but in
the Constitution's own phrase, "to form a more perfect Union" between
right and rights within that charter's necessarily evolutionary design. 136

Finally, for the progressive instrumentalist, constitutional interpretation is open, rather than closed, because at least parts of the Constitution contain an anti-subordination subtext that at any point can be
legitimately realized. As for the idealist, the indeterminacy of the
Constitution for the anti-subordinationist is a contingent fact, not an
existential necessity: the Constitution contains an anti-subordinationist subtext not because all texts contain such subtexts, but because this
one, as a matter of historical fact, does. Parts of the Constitution,
notably the fourteenth amendment and the precedential authority interpreting it, when properly read, explicitly target illegitimate social
hierarchy. Patterns of domination that stem from the social subordination of one group by another, and that cripple, maim, impoverish,
and stunt lives, are therefore not only moral abominations (and they
are surely that) - they are also unconstitutional. The progressive instrumentalist supports the possibilistic paradigm of progressive interpretation through a rigorous and careful, rather than playful and
anarchic, reading of the texts themselves.
To summarize, progressives converge on a possibilistic understanding of the nature of constitutional interpretation, a substantive account
of the "equality" to which individuals are entitled under the equal protection clause, and an affirmative account of the "liberty" guaranteed
under due process. The contrasting grounds for support might be
characterized in this way:
136. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at vii-viii.
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Interpretation
(Open)

Equality
(Substantive)

Liberty
(Positive)

Idealist
Progressives

Constitution as a
cultural ideal

Substantive equality necessary for
the good life

Positive liberty
necessary for the
good life

Existential
Progressives

Necessity of
interpretative
choice

Equality the
pre-condition
of authenticity

Liberty defined
as authenticity

Anti-Subordination Progressives

Constitution as
imperfect embodiment of
anti-subordination
ideal

Eradication of
hierarchy the
purpose of equal
protection

Ambivalence in
tension with antisubordination
goals

Finally, the contrast between the progressive and conservative paradigms can be schematized in this way:
Interpretation

Equality
(Equal Protection)

Liberty
(Substantive
Due Process)

Conservative Imperativist;
Originalist;
judicial restraint

Precludes benign as
well as malicious
race-conscious
decisionmaking

Defined by
community
traditions

Progressive

Requires affirmative
eradication of
hierarchy

Defined by ideals

Possibilistic; Open;
Necessity of choice

Virtually all of the significant differences between conservative and
progressive understandings of constitutional meanings are squarely
rooted in divergent political attitudes toward social power. What the
conservative sees as the institutional form or wellspring of communitarian wisdom, legal legitimacy, or market competition, the progressive sees as an oppressive domestic, social, legal, or economic
hierarchy. What the conservative sees as the wisdom of the family, the
progressive sees as an institution that perpetuates sexual and heterosexual hierarchy. What the conservative sees as respect for the "ties
that bind" in subcommunities, the progressive is likely to see as xenophobia toward outsiders and oppressive conformism toward members.
What the conservative sees as the market institutions that facilitate
free individual choice, the progressive sees as the mechanism of widescale economic oppression. What the conservative sees as legitimate
legal institutions that maintain order and reduce conflict, the progressive sees as instruments of ideological oppression that induce a mindnumbing homogeneity and hegemonic conformity.
Similarly, progressive and conservative constitutional meanings
stem from these divergent perceptions of the value of social hierarchy.
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Let me begin with the Court's due process and privacy jurisprudence.
The divergent understandings of due process, and the conflicting assessments of cases such as Griswold, Roe, Webster, and Bowers central
to the two constitutional paradigms, are grounded in conflicting attitudes toward social power - not in divergent understandings of the
precedential authority and not in contrasting jurisprudential understandings of the nature of law. Thus, the moral conservative sees the
wisdom of the ages in precisely the communitaria:n traditions in which
the anti-subordination progressive sees the oppression of ancient hierarchies. The conservative natural lawyer thus sees the proper role of
law as guarding and preserving communitarian wisdom, and the
proper role of constitutional law as preserving that wisdom against the
erratic and whimsical dictates of popular opinion. The progressive instrumentalist, by contrast, sees the Constitution as one central tool by
which social hierarchy, embedded and reflected· in law, can be
eradicated.
The difference between these views does not, however, lie in the
difference between natural law and instrumentalism; natural law is not
essentially conservative, nor is instrumentalism essentially progressive.
The difference is rooted in conflicting conservative and progressive attitudes toward social power. Thus, a conservative natural lawyer morally committed to the view that communitarian moral traditions are
the source of our knowledge regarding the "good" will not be able to
view the various religious, secular, and familial institutional structures
that generate those traditions as the source of illegitimate domination,
damaging subordination, and stultifying oppression. Nor will he or
she see the unlived ideals or dreams of the subordinated, rather than
those traditions, as the truer aspirational purpose - and hence meaning - of the liberty clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Similarly, the differences between conservative and progressive understandings of equal protection, and the conflicting assessments of
affirmative action programs that arise from those understandings, are
rooted not in divergent interpretations of the constitutional tradition,
but more deeply in divergent experiences and assessments of the normative values generated by competitive economic hierarchy. The freemarket conservative sees competition, and hence the creation of value,
where the progressive sees illegitimate private hierarchies of class. In
jurisprudential terms, the conservative instrumentalist sees law as instrumentally aimed at freeing competition, and reads the equal protection clause to facilitate that end, while the progressive instrumentalist
sees law as instrumentally aimed at eradicating illegitimate private and
social hierarchy, and reads the equal protection clause to facilitate that

712

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:641

diametrically opposed end. The difference between them lies in their
divergent assessments of, and perhaps experiences with, the social arrangements that constitute both the substance and the framework of
private competitive hierarchy. Free-market conservatives, who view
competition as the organizing principle of authoritative normativity,
will clearly not view the hierarchies that facilitate "competition" as
experiences of subordination and domination against which the moral
weight of the equal protection clause should be pitted.
!Lastly, the difference between the conservative insistence that interpretation requires obedience toward legitimated commands, and the
progressive view that interpretation invites choice, stems not from divergent understandings of either the nature of interpretation or of constitutionalism, but rather from divergent responses to the imperative
dimension oflegal power. Because the literature is vast and familiar, I
can afford to be blunt: as the grossly disproportionate conservative
response to the "indeterminacy claim" of the Critical Legal Studies
movement has made vividly clear, a positivistic conservative wedded
to the virtue of obedience is likely to respond hysterically to a view
that identifies law with the necessity of choice, the burden of freedom,
and the openness of possibility. What the conservative positivist sees
as a source of authority facilitating moral outcomes through obedience, the progressive positivist sees as texts facilitating authentic
choice through interpretive freedom. The difference, then, stems from
drastically divergent assessments of the morality of obedience and the
morality of choice: for the conservative, obedience facilitates morality,
for the progressive, choice does so.
If this is right, then our presently constituted post-liberal constitutional discourse is somewhat pathological. Rather than discuss our
divergent attitudes toward social and private power, modem constitutionalists who have abandoned pretensions to constitutional neutrality
avoid politics and ethics by discussing instead their manifestations in
conflicting jurisprudential conceptions. These debates, unsurprisingly,
resolve nothing. The differences between conservative and progressive
constitutional commitments can no more be understood as rooted in
jurisprudence than in contrasting understandings of constitutional
authority.
Thus, to take a specific example, the contrast between progressive
and conservative understandings of the privacy cases cannot be explained or resolved by prior case authority - as the progressives and
conservatives themselves seem increasingly inclined to grant. But nor
can they be explained by, and hence resolved by, differences between
natural law on the one hand and either positivism or pragmatism on
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the other; natural law, positivism, and instrumentalism are all open to
both conservative and progressive political use. Rather, our different
assessments of Bowers 137 (as well as of Webster1 38) rest not on contrasting jurisprudential understandings of the nature of law, but on
contrasting attitudes toward various forms of social authority. First,
they rest on contrasting assessments of the value of the traditional
family: what the conservative natural lawyer sees as social morality
and legitimate legal authority the progressive natural lawyer sees (and
may well have experienced) as a political mechanism of exploitation
and oppression. Second, they rest on contrasting attitudes toward sexuality: what the conservative instrumentalist sees as nonreproductive,
immoral sexuality the progressive instrumentalist sees as a
subordinated sexual orientation. And third, they rest on contrasting
attitudes toward the import of constitutional authority: what the conservative positivist reads as mandating obedience the progressive positivist reads as mandating choice. Politics, ethics, and experience not jurisprudence and not constitutional law - determine these differing commitments. We will not resolve those differences, or, more
modestly, come any closer toward a mutual understanding of their
roots, by pursuing jurisprudential battles, any more than by pursuing
traditional constitutional arguments.

III.

CONCLUSION: CONSERVATIVE DOMINANCE OR
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

It seems safe to predict that the progressive understanding of the
Constitution now being developed by progressive theorists will not
achieve much success with the explicitly conservative Court over the
next few decades. But, it is important to remember, the progressive
interpretation of the Constitution did not do especially well in front of
the liberal Court of the last thirty years either. During the fifties, sixties, and seventies, progressive gains were only occasional, and all of
them, including both Brown 139 and later Roe, 140 were almost immediately compromised when accommodated into the dominant liberal
vision. 141
In this conclusion I want to suggest briefly that there may be rea137. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
138. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., ~09 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
139. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
140. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
141. See Strauss, The Taming of Brown, supra note 4; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Poetker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977).
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sons to suspect that there are deeper tensions, not just between the
progressive and conservative interpretations of the Constitution, but
between the progressive paradigm and the idea of adjudicative law
within which both liberal and conservative courts operate. To the degree that progressives acquiesce in an understanding of the Constitution and of constitutional guarantees as a body of adjudicative law as something that courts enforce as law against unwilling parties they may be committed to a definition of constitutionalism that is antithetical to the goals of progressive politics and the phrase "progressive
constitutionalism" may remain an anomaly.
The idea of "adjudicative law" may be antithetical to the progressive understanding of the Constitution for at least four reasons. First,
progressives understand constitutional law as possibilistic and openended, as change rather than regularity and as freedom rather than
constraint. This understanding of constitutionalism may be right, and
it may even be right as an account oflaw, but as an account of adjudicative law - of what courts in fact do - it is perverse. Adjudicative
law is persistently authoritarian: demonstration of the "truth" of legal
propositions (arguably unlike other truth statements) relentlessly requires shows of positive authority. Existentialism may not be an odd
foundation for a theory of politics, legislation, or constitutionalism,
but it is certainly an odd (to say the least) grounding for a theory of
adjudication. The lesson from this tension between the possibilistic
Constitution envisioned by progressives and the authoritarian structure of adjudicative law is not necessarily that the conventional account of adjudicative law as requiring demonstrations of binding
authority is wrong; rather, the important point may be that the identification of constitutional process and choices with the sphere of adjudicative rather than legislative legality - with law rather than politics
- is misguided.
Second, the instrumental goal toward which the progressive Constitution is aimed is the abolition of subordinating and damaging hierarchies. The justice to which it aspires is not corrective but
distributive. Yet the ideal of justice to which adjudicative law aspires
has historically been primarily corrective and compensatory, rather
than redistributive. 142 Another way to put the point is that adjudicative law has for the most part been essentially conservative: it maintains, stabilizes, and reifies the status quo against change. It exists to
protect against change. Anti-subordination is accordingly a peculiar
goal to establish for adjudicative law. It is not, however, a peculiar
142. For a full discussion of this point, see C. Sunstein, The Limits of Compensatory Justice
(NOMOS, forthcoming 1991).
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goal for legislation, nor is it an odd or outlandish understanding of the
import of the fourteenth amendment. Perhaps, again, we should conclude from this not that it is misguided to understand adjudicative law
as aimed at corrective rather than redistributive justice, but rather that
it is misguided to conceive of a progressive and radically redistributive
directive document such as the fourteenth amendment as a source of
adjudicative law, rather than as a source of inspiration or guidance for
legislative change.
Third, the "morality" that adjudicative law undoubtedly absorbs
from time to time is almost invariably conventional and traditional,
rather than aspirational or utopian. The Court may indeed read "the
Law" through the lens of morality, but the morality that comprises
the lens is the morality embraced by the dominant forces in the community, 143 not an aspirational morality of unlived ideals informed by
experiences of oppression. 144 Adjudicative law typically reflects a
community's moral beliefs, and only rarely its aspirational ideals. Perhaps, then, we should .conclude not that the conventional understanding of the relation between adjudicative law and conventional morality
is wrong, but that the Constitution - because it is indeed open to an
aspirational interpretation - is simply not exclusively a source of adjudicative law.
Fourth, the form and processes of "adjudication" create additional
tensions for the progressive paradigm, quite apart from and. no less
serious than those created by the idea of adjudicative law. As anyone
who has ever been unwillingly caught in the process knows, adjudication is profoundly elitist, hierarchic, and nonparticipatory. It is itself a
form of domination that creates experiences of subordination. The
protestations of modem civic republicans notwithstanding, it is the antithesis of participatory democratic politics. The obsessive attention
given by civic republican and liberal constitutionalists alike to the
"anti-majoritarian difficulty" posed by aggressive judicial review has
not done anything actually to solve the difficulty. It has, rather, only
served to highlight the utter incompatibility of both liberals' and republican's substantive commitment to equalitarian and participatory
democracy with their simultaneous endorsement of nonparticipatory,
anti-democratic, and intensely hierarchical adjudicative processes for
achieving it. 145
143. See Fiss, supra note 21, at 753; compare West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some
Reservations About the Law-as-Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REv. 203, 210-19 (1987).
144. The notable exception, of course, is Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
145. Perhaps the clearest example of this attempt to square a circle, and to accommodate
antimajoritarian judicial review with participatory theories of republicanism and democracy, is
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There are still other distorting constraints imposed by adjudication
upon the progressive paradigm. To name just a few: Adjudication
presupposes bipolar conflicts; progressivism does not. Adjudication
requires at every tum in the road recitation of and support from "authority"; progressivism is constitutively distrustful of authority. Adjudication requires a recalcitrant, guilty, state defendant, one
consequence of which is a judicially constructed "nightwatchman"like Constitution that can act only against pernicious state action,
while progressivism understands the problems of inequality, subordination, and bondage in our lives to stem not from state action, but
from private and social action followed by state inaction - the failure
of the state to act against private oppression. Adjudication is particularistic and individualistic; progressivism is anything but. And, finally, adjudication blames, condemns, and punishes; progressivism is
fundamentally uninterested, on many levels and for complex reasons,
with blame and innocence. These are surely good reasons to fear that
a progressive Constitution is not going to fare well in any adjudicative
body, not just in front of a conservative Supreme Court.
The consequence of the tension between adjudication and progressivism is that the legalization of constitutional discourse may have seriously impoverished the progressive tradition. When we read our
progressive politics through the lens of the Constitution, and then read
the Constitution through the lens of law, we burden progressivism
with the constraints, limits, doctrines, and nature of law. Progressivism - its very content - becomes identified with that which courts
might do, and that which lawyers can feasibly argue. In the process,
progressivism in the courts becomes weak and diluted. The consequence of this tension is not only, however, that progressivism in the
Supreme Court is impoverished, although clearly it is. The consequence is also that progressive politics outside the Court is robbed of
whatever rhetorical and political support it might have received from
a de-legalized conception of the progressive Constitution. In a culture
that routinely identifies its political aspirations with constitutionalism,
it becomes extremely difficult to demand progressive change of a nature that the adjudicated Constitution cannot support. Redistributive
progressive politics, for example, may be burdened by the "shadow
effect" of the refusal, both on the Court and outside it, to understand
poverty as a suspect basis of classification, or minimal material wellbeing as a fundamental right. More generally, any anti-subordinationist progressive legislation is marginalized by the inability of the Court
Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 4. For a full discussion of this point, see
Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175 (1986).
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to "find" an anti-subordination principle in the Constitution. Constitutionalism defines our public morality, to some extent, and the failure
of the adjudicated Constitution to accommodate progressive ends accordingly impoverishes progressive morality.
Thus, progressive politics is impoverished by the adjudicated Constitution simply because it loses the force, and power, of constitutional
thought. The legal profession pervasively, and the larger culture
somewhat, has come to view the Constitution as the repository of public morality; as the source, genesis, and articulation of our political
obligations. If our collective social morality and our moral aspirations
are embedded in our Constitution, if the Constitution is a form of adjudicative "law," and if adjudicative law exists in a state of profound
and perpetual (and not particularly creative) tension with progressive
morality and ideals, then this conclusion is inescapable: progressive
morality will never become part of our public morality, regardless of
the composition of the Supreme Court. Progressive constitutionalism
may be part of the problem (as the saying goes), not part of the solution. If progressive constitutionalists care as much about progressive
politics as they care about the Constitution (a big "if'}, then the imperative is unavoidable: the circle must be broken.
By way of conclusion, let me briefly characterize some of the gains
of reorienting progressive constitutional discourse toward legislative
rather than adjudicative action, and toward a congressional rather
than a judicial audience. First, and perhaps most important, if we
were to recharacterize our progressive understanding of the constitutional guarantees of liberty and equality as political ideals to guide
legislation, rather than as legal restraints on legislation, many of these
tensions within the progressive understanding of the Constitution
would disappear. If we imagine Congress, rather than the Court, as
the implicit audience of constitutional argument, it becomes far easier
to envision arguments to the effect that the fourteenth amendment requires, rather than permits (as within the liberal paradigm) or precludes (as in the conservative) progressive objectives such as
affirmative action programs, child care and support programs, greater
police responsiveness to private and domestic violence, reform of marital rape laws, and the criminalization of homophobic, racist, and sexist
assaults. Congress, after all, has the textual obligation to do something
about the states' refusal to provide what the progressive means by
"equal protection" - to protect the citizenry against the damaging
effects of rampant social and private inequality.
It is easier to envision these arguments succeeding - it is easier, in
fact, even to state them - not only because the fourteenth amendment
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is explicitly directed toward Congress rather than the Court, and not
only because of the present composition of the Court, but also because
of the differences between constraint and aspiration, tradition and
ideal, corrective and distributive justice, the history of our settled past
and the politics of our future possibilities, participatory lawmaking
and adjudicative law enforcement. It is easier, in short, to envision the
actualization of the progressive Constitution through legislative action
than through adjudicative law because of the difference between law
and politics.
Second, if progressives were to reorient progressive constitutional
debate toward legislative politics rather than adjudicative law, they
would invigorate and enrich the terms and stakes of public debate. It
is a truism that contemporary discourse in the public sphere has become nihilistic and devoid of a sense of moral purpose. A constitutionalized legislative process might reinject a sense of moral urgency,
of moral purpose, and even of moral obligation into a morally bankrupt process. Again the reason for this should not be mysterious: we
have become societally accustomed to understanding the Constitution
as the repository of public and public-spirited morality. We have also,
however, become accustomed to understanding the courts, rather than
the Congress, as the forum for constitutional articulation and obligation. The Court, then, is understood as the locus of moral understanding and debate. It is hardly surprising that the consequence is a public
perception, if not the reality, of a legislative branch mired in a thicket
of narrow self-interest. We have, in effect, alienated the responsibility
for public morality to the courts. One solution (and the solution for
which I have argued elsewhere) 146 is to invigorate nonconstitutional
moral public discourse. Given the pervasiveness of the perceived
equation of public morality with constitutionalism, however, that may
not be possible. The other solution is to expand the scope and audience of constitutional discourse.
Third, if we were to reorient progressive constitutionalism toward
Congress, we would, perhaps paradoxically, strengthen the legal position of progressive legislation when it is invariably challenged in court
as violative of conservatively understood constitutional guarantees.
Most of the significant items on any progressive political agenda are
seriously threatened by the possibility of invalidation by the present
conservative Supreme Court. A conservative Lochner-like 141 understanding of the due process clause such as that embraced by the early
146. West, supra note 26.
147. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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New Deal Court, like a conservative understanding of the takings
clause such as that propounded by Richard Epstein, 148 obviously jeopardizes congressional action aimed at social hierarchies bolstered by
gross maldistributions of wealth, including legislation ranging from
the progressive tax system to comparable worth and child care proposals presently under congressional consideration. Similarly, a conservative understanding of equal protection as protecting the individual's
right to participate in a color-blind market threatens, if it has not already eviscerated, affirmative action plans, as evidenced by the Court's
recent decision in Croson. 149 And lastly, conservative understandings
of the nature and limits of constitutional interpretation threaten the
adjudicative gains made by progressives through imaginative use of a
possibilistic and open-ended Constitution, as evidenced by the judicial
retreat from active judicial protection of privacy in both Bowers150 and
Webster. 151 With conservative interpretation now dominating the
Court, constitutional challenges to progressive legislation are virtually
inevitable, and many will prove successful. We might be able to slow
the tide of those attacks, if we strengthen the rhetorical and political
base of our progressive legislative proposals, by grounding them not
only in politics and policy but also in arguments draw~ from constitutional mandate as well.
The gains for progressive politics would be no less tangible. A constitutionalized progressive agenda would centralize progressive concerns and lend them far greater legitimacy. Progressive politics, as
discussed above, are crippled in this culture in part because of their
lack of constitutional legitimacy - progressivism does not seem to be
mandated by the Constitution and increasingly may come to seem
precluded by it. Constitutionalism, in other words, if it remains the
exclusive interpretive dominion of the Court, has the effect not only of
marginalizing but even of delegitimating progressive gains: everything
on the modern progressive agenda - from mandatory child care, to
zoning, to comparable worth, to reproductive freedom, to affirmative
action - is now, given the dominance of the conservative paradigm,
an arguably unconstitutional taking, an infringement of a constitutionally protected interest in property or contractual freedom, a denial of
equal protection, or a denial of a fundamental right to life. This is, of
course, in part a function of larger societal conservatism infecting constitutional language. All I want to suggest is that it is surely also, in
148.
149.
150.
151.

R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
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part, a function of the truncation of progressive constitutional thought
through the identification of the Constitution with adjudicative law.
Finally, a reorientation of progressive constitutionalism to the legislative arena would bring progressive constitutionalism into line, for
the first time in this country, with progressive politics. Progressive
constitutionalists constrain the progressive constitutional tradition so
as to fit what is perceived to be possible in the adjudicative sphere.
The result is a very weak vision of progressive politics. When our
politics are constrained by what courts will or will not do, we lose
much of what is central to the progressive cause, including, most significantly, a constitutional as well as legislative commitment to the
eradication of what must surely be the most crushing and "subordinating" hierarchy of all: poverty. The reason why is clear enough: with
the demands of adjudication governing the interpretation of the Constitution, and with constitutionalism in turn constraining progressivism, we have come to choose our progressive political commitments to
fit our lawyerly sense of what the Court might buy, instead of our
political and moral sense of what people are most in need of. During
the liberal era, this may have looked like an acceptable trade-off. But
it clearly is not in a period of conservative domination. The constitutional rights of the homeless, the poor, the victims of institutional and
social racism, the large class of undervalued and underpaid female
workers, to say nothing of the uncared for children, cannot be allowed
to disappear or remain unarticulated simply because they will not be
judicially heard. When we quit thinking of the Constitution and its
promise within the confines of courts, plaintiffs, defendants, causes of
action, actionable intent, state action, malice or the lack thereof,
standing to sue, mootness, procedural safeguards, and the rest of the
legal apparatus designed for the application and adjudication of law,
we will see a Constitution that is at once more progressive, more political, more challenging, more just, and more aspirational than we have
yet imagined.
Progressives have clearly lost the Court to conservative domination, and stand in danger of losing - or worse, conceding - the Constitution as well to conservative interpretation. We can easily imagine
a world in which the Constitution has become thoroughly identified
with conservative causes; perhaps we already live in one. In such a
world, political progressives would, in effect, concede both the Court
and the Constitution to conservatism, seek, instead, political victories
in the interstices of Congress, dodge judicial intervention, and hope
against hope for unexpected judicial victories. Progressivism would
remain strictly political, and legislative; conservatism would become
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thoroughly constitutionalized. The conservative Court then would act
as a brake - but with the full force of constitutional authority and
rhetoric behind it - on progressive legislative politics. This would
obviously be a disaster for progressive politics in this country. It is,
however, a disaster in which progressive constitutionalists seem perversely willing to acquiesce.
There is an obvious alternative to this scenario of conservative constitutional victory. Progressive constitutionalists, as well as progressive legislators, could try to create a viable progressive interpretation
of the Constitution, congressionally and popularly supported, with the
explicit aim of creating a modern "constitutional moment." A conservative Court will never mandate or even seriously entertain a progressive interpretation of congressional meaning. But all courts, as
Owen Fiss argues, "read [the Constitution] in a way to avoid crises."152 This will be even more true of a Court committed not only to
the prevention of crisis, but to a positivistic account of law and legal
legitimacy and a deferential attitude toward conventional morality.
Such a Court, if faced with a legislative agenda firmly and explicitly
grounded in a second (or third) Bill of Rights - welfare rights, antisubordination rights, autonomy rights, rights of intimacy, reproductive rights, employment rights - all constitutionally mandated and all
popularly supported - would learn, or re-learn, to read the Constitution so as to avoid a confrontation with an awakened populace. A
responsible as well as conservative Court - and there is no reason to
think this is not one - would not and could not long impede the work
of a progressive Congress newly enlivened to its constitutional
obligations.
The key, of course, is to create a progressive Congress, and behind
it a progressive citizenry. We presently have neither, to put it lightly.
But surely we could, and surely we should, and maybe the likelihood
of having one would be enhanced by constitutionalizing progressive
causes. The question is where to invest our energies, how to spend our
lives. All I want to suggest is that a life spent reorienting progressive
constitutionalism toward participatory and democratic forums and
away from the insulated and elitist judiciary would be a life well spent.
It would well serve progressive politics and causes by giving them constitutional status. It would well serve the democratic, participatory
process by giving it a sense of both idealism and constitutional purpose. Finally, it would serve even the Constitution by actualizing its
as yet untappe,9, unexplored, but rich progressive promise.
152. Fiss, supra note 21, at 754.

